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Articles
Statutes in Common Law Courts
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski*
The Supreme Court teaches that federal courts, unlike their counterparts in
the states, are not general common law courts. Nevertheless, a perennial point
of contention among federal law scholars is whether and how a court’s common
law powers affect its treatment of statutes. Textualists point to federal courts’
lack of common law powers to reject purposivist statutory interpretation. Critics
of textualism challenge this characterization of federal courts’ powers,
leveraging a more robust notion of the judicial power to support purposivist or
dynamic interpretation. This disagreement has become more important in recent
years with the emergence of a refreshing movement in the theory of statutory
interpretation. While debate about federal statutory interpretation has settled
into a holding pattern, scholars have begun to consider whether state courts
should interpret statutes differently than federal courts and, if so, the
implications of that fact for federal and general interpretation.
This Article aspires to help theorize this emerging field as a whole while
making progress on one of its most important parts, namely the question of the
difference that common law powers make to statutory interpretation. This
inquiry takes us beyond the familiar moves in federal debates on interpretation.
In turn, it suggests an interpretive method that defies both orthodox textualism
and purposivism in that it may permit courts to extend statutory rules and
principles by analogy while prohibiting courts from narrowing the scope of
statutes in the name of purpose or equity. Such a model accounts for state court
practice at the intersection of statutes and common law that recent work on state
court textualism neither confronts nor explains. This model also informs federal
theorization, both by challenging received wisdom about the relationship
between common law and statutes and by offering guidance to federal courts at
the intersection of statutes and pockets of federal common law.
The framework this Article constructs to approach the common law
question can also help organize the fledgling field of state–federal comparison
more generally. With this framework, we can begin to sort out the conflicting
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and overlapping strands of argument already in the literature while also having
a template for future inquiries. At the same time, this framework can help us
think about intersystemic interpretation with greater rigor—an advance that can
aid state and federal jurisprudence alike.

Introduction
The revival of theory in statutory interpretation is one of the most
significant events in American public law in the past three decades.1 The
field continues to develop and its participants continue to disagree about how
to read statutes. Yet even among some of the partisans, there is a sense that
where there was once wide-ranging debate, there is now a settled
equilibrium, if not an argumentative rut. “The guns in the statutory interpretation wars,” one commentator muses, “are now largely silent.”2 Another,
a critic of academic textualism, finds a “strong consensus on the interpretive
enterprise that dwarfs any differences that remain.”3 Existing debate, on this
account, obscures “just how thoroughly modern textualism has succeeded in
dominating contemporary statutory interpretation.”4
The dust from the Thirty Years’ statutory interpretation wars may have
settled and, while textualism has not won an unconditional surrender in the
Supreme Court, it appears to have gained substantial territory before its truce
with purposivism. If this is so, the scope of interpretive argument at the
Supreme Court has narrowed in recent decades. Thus, scholars that synthesize and criticize that jurisprudence on its own terms may have to focus on a
correspondingly modest number of questions. Even assuming that the
Court’s equilibrium is stable, however, that agreement covers only a tip of
the interpretive iceberg. Statutory interpretation scholars have filled shelves
of law reviews while focusing almost exclusively on the Supreme Court in
general and on its exposition of federal public law in particular.5 This
inquiry usually ignores the bulk of statutory interpretation cases in the United

1. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 250–56 (1992) (chronicling the rise of interpretation theory
in the 1980s).
2. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 732 (2010).
3. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006).
4. Id. at 36.
5. For salutary exceptions, see Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of
Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 318 (2005) (arguing that inferior courts have no sound basis
for applying the Supreme Court’s doctrine of statutory stare decisis); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433,
433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy
and arguing that these differences “justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels
of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods”); Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public
Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 875 (1991) (exploring how modern common law judges, in light of the
role of statutes as the primary source of law, should view their role in relationship to the
legislature).
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States, namely those resolved by state courts.6 The question of whether
federal and state court interpretive methodology should run parallel is
important, hardly obvious, and rarely pondered.
Or at least that was so until very recently. In the past few years, a small
number of legal scholars have begun to examine theories of interpretation
with a lens wider than that of federal review.7 This work, primarily by junior
scholars, is the beginning of a fresh line of inquiry that promises insights not
only on neglected matters of state court interpretation, but also on the
received wisdom in federal interpretation and interpretive theory more
generally. Two questions are prominent in this fledgling literature. First,
whether state courts should interpret their statutes differently than how
federal courts read federal statutes.8 Second, if methods diverge, how to
interpret statutes across the borders of jurisdictions with different methods.9
This Article pursues the first divergence question with hopes of also
shedding light on both the second intersystemic question and federal
interpretation more generally. It does so by taking up an important but
underexplored problem: whether a state court with general common law
powers should approach statutes differently than a federal court that, in the
post-Erie era,10 is understood to lack such powers. This question will also
serve as a platform for building a more general framework for considering
the divergence question. With this framework, we can begin to sort out the
conflicting and overlapping strands of inquiry already in the literature while
having a template for future inquiries. At the same time, this framework can
help us think about the intersystemic question with greater rigor—an advance
that will aid state and federal jurisprudence alike. In short, this Article
aspires to help define and theorize a promising new line of inquiry as a whole
while making progress on one of its more substantial parts.

6. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS iv (2010) (noting that approximately 95% of all
cases filed in the United States are filed in state court); see also Abbe R. Gluck, The States as
Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified
Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] (“The vast majority
of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the
mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts—and, really, only the less-than-one
percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides.”).
7. See, e.g., Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1750 (discussing modern statutory
interpretation in several state courts of last resort).
8. See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 5, at 439 (identifying several institutional differences that
“militate in favor of interpretive divergences across courts”).
9. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and
the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1991–92 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic]
(highlighting that federal and state courts do not consider whether they are required to apply one
another’s methodology when interpreting each other’s statutes).
10. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (“Federal courts, unlike
state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to develop and
apply their own rules of decision.”).
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Exploring the difference common law powers make in courts’ treatment
of statutes takes the inquiry beyond the familiar moves in debates about
federal statutory interpretation. State courts assessing the interpretive
implications of their common law powers should consider sources besides
Supreme Court precedent on ordinary interpretation. Indeed, perhaps the
most instructive body of precedent on this question can be found not in the
United States Reports, but in the high courts of commonwealth jurisdictions
like the United Kingdom and Australia which, like American state courts,
must reconcile their general common lawmaking powers with a superior
legislature’s statutes. Finally, common law courts may have to confront
jurisprudential questions about the interpretation of statutes and precedent
that federal courts arguably can avoid.
All told, a plausible result of these inquiries is an interpretive method
that defies both orthodox textualism and purposivism as we know it, a hybrid
model that permits courts to extend statutory rules and principles by analogy
while prohibiting courts from narrowing the scope of statutes in the name of
nontextual purpose or equity. This common law/parliamentary hybrid accounts for state court practice at the intersection of statutes and common law
that recent groundbreaking work on state court textualism neither confronts
nor explains. Such a model can also inform federal theorization, both by
challenging received wisdom about the relationship between common law
and statutes and by offering guidance to federal courts when statutes and
enclaves of federal common law meet.
I.

Federal and State Statutory Interpretation

To set the stage for the broader argument, this Part summarizes the state
of play in both federal and state statutory interpretation theory. In many
respects, the state of scholarship in the two fields could not be more different.
In the federal context, decades of sustained argument appear to have
narrowed disagreement among scholars and judges to a smaller set of
problems. If the revival of statutory interpretation theory in federal courts
has settled down to a new equilibrium, theorization about interpretation
outside the federal context is just starting to stir. This small but diverse body
of work both hints at and calls out for a general framework for thinking about
interpretation in state courts and across jurisdictions.
A.

Federal Statutory Interpretation and Faithful Agent Equilibrium

Federal statutory interpretation theory is a natural baseline for
comparison with the state context, if only because such work defines most of
the conceptual space in which American courts and scholars operate. A
review of recent case law and much of the scholarly literature suggests that
encapsulating this federal jurisprudence is easier now than it was twenty
years ago. A vigorous, wide-ranging debate between textualism and its
critics appears to have stabilized and turned to a set of narrower, albeit
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fundamental, questions about interpretation. At the Supreme Court, the
assumed framework in recent decades is one of faithful agency to Congress,
a framework in significant part constructed on textualist terms. Although the
Court has not granted every item on the textualist wish list, the Court’s
jurisprudence appears to reject strong purposivist or dynamic approaches to
interpretation.
If, as some have argued, “[t]he guns in the statutory interpretation wars
are now largely silent,”11 it is fair to ask how they quieted so. Professor John
Manning’s recent history of interpretive theory tells a story of dialectic and
synthesis between textualism and purposivism in the Supreme Court’s
reading of statutes.12 Starting in the early 1980s, founding textualists
emphasized empirical challenges to the use of legislative history and the
coherence of invoking a legislative body’s “intent” or “purpose.”13 In
response, textualism’s critics drew on public choice theory to defend a
moderated use of legislative history and to shore up the cogency and
reliability of appeals to congressional intent and purpose.14 At the same time,
purposivists and intentionalists pointed out that textualists regularly relied on
interpretive tools beyond the statutory text, such as canons of interpretation,
common law understandings, and dictionaries.15 Textualism, according to
these criticisms, was premised on bad political science and was internally
contradictory in its use of external sources.16
In response, Manning accedes that this criticism “clouded the cleanly
intuitive appeal of the empirical claims” that early textualists made against
legislative history, intent, and purpose.17 Manning also agrees that texts are
not self-revealing and that textualists can, do, and should use some extrinsic
sources.18 This is not because those extrinsic sources are authoritative, but
because they are useful contextual evidence for identifying what a
hypothetical legislator at the time of enactment would seek to convey to a

11. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 732.
12. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287 (2010)
[hereinafter Manning, Second-Generation].
13. Id. at 1291–92.
14. See id. at 1298–303 (discussing the responses of textualism’s critics—including Farber and
Frickey’s specific critiques of textualists’ interest group theory and social choice theory—to the
practical assumptions underlying textualism). For a recent philosophical defense of collective,
parliamentary intent, see generally Richard Ekins, The Intention of Parliament, 2010 PUB. L. 709.
15. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 3, at 30–36 (praising textualism’s recognition that language
only has meaning in context); see also John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from
Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 79–85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides]
(discussing modern textualists’ use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective
intent of a statutory text).
16. See Molot, supra note 3, at 49–50 (explaining that when modern or aggressive textualists
ignore a statute’s context, they risk being judicial activists and disregarding congressional intent).
17. Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1303.
18. Id. at 1308.

484

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:479

reasonable reader of legal English.19 Finally, Manning accedes that when a
text remains vague or ambiguous, textualists can justifiably make “rough
estimates” of statutory purpose to resolve cases.20 On the other hand, he
notes that purposivists not only use similar extrinsic sources to understand
statutes, but in recent years have focused increasingly on statutory text and
structure.21 Like textualists, “purposivists start—and most of the time end—
their inquiry with the semantic meaning of the text.”22 Given these
similarities, a sharp contrast between textualism and its rivals is hard to see,
and much recent scholarship searches for that very distinction.23
On this question, Manning emphasizes nonempirical, constitutional
arguments for textualism. He posits a theoretically simpler textualism that
adheres to a more modest and basic tenet about statutory interpretation: when
the semantic meaning of a statutory text is clear to the reasonable reader, a
court must honor that meaning even when doing so appears to conflict with a
statute’s broader purpose or policy.24 This choice between semantic meaning
and conflicting policy, Manning explains, is the basic question dividing
textualists and purposivists.25 The textualist’s prioritization of semantic
meaning over broader purpose is controversial. Some purposivists call on
academic textualists, who have “won” the interpretive “war” in the Supreme
Court, to accept moderate deviations from this tenet, such as the canon
against absurd interpretations.26 Others claim that this apparently modest

19. See Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 79 (describing modern textualists’ belief that
language is only intelligible in its context); see also John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116
HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2457 (2003) [hereinafter Manning, Absurdity Doctrine] (discussing modern
textualism’s emphasis on understanding language in its social context).
20. Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 84–85.
21. Id. at 85.
22. Id. at 87.
23. Compare Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005) (observing that
prior scholarship has exaggerated the difference between the goals of textualism and intentionalism
while underappreciating their differing attitudes towards rules and standards), with John F.
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005) (maintaining that textualists
and intentionalists offer differing conceptions of legislative intent), and Caleb Nelson, A Response
to Professor Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451 (2005) (reiterating that textualists and purposivists
largely agree on the goals of interpretation); compare Molot, supra note 3 (rejecting the traditional
line dividing textualists and purposivists and proposing a moderate version of textualism to appeal
to both sides), with Manning, What Divides, supra note 15 (conceding that textualism and
purposivism share more conceptual common ground than normally acknowledged but noting that
textualism prioritizes semantic context while purposivism prioritizes policy context); see also Larry
Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free
Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 982–84 (2004) (arguing that
textualism is most plausibly understood as rule-restricted intentionalism).
24. Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1309–10; see also Manning, What Divides,
supra note 15, at 76 (noting that textualists give semantic cues determinative weight even where
conflicting evidence of policy exists).
25. Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 91.
26. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
117, 119 (2009) (citing Molot, supra note 3) (noting purposivists’ suggestions that textualists
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tenet is textualism’s Achilles’ heel, a methodological weakness that will
ultimately doom a theory that upholds increasingly absurd and outmoded
interpretations.27
Yet disagreement on this basic point stands out among a broader
convergence in both the Supreme Court and much recent scholarship.28
Manning argues persuasively that the Supreme Court has now settled at an
equilibrium in which it has reduced, rather than eliminated, its use of
legislative history while also increasing its attention to statutory text at the
expense of broader purposive inquiry.29 Further, the disagreement at the
Supreme Court concerns not whether the interpreter should be a faithful
agent of Congress or a dynamic partner in governance, but whether
Congress’s faithful agent should adhere to text or purpose when the two
conflict. Even the Court’s more purposivist opinions take pains to ground
their interpretations in both semantic meaning and overarching policy.30 If
there are any Calabresian judicial artists or metademocrats on the Court,31
they are well-hidden.
This is not to judge the merits of strong purposivist or dynamic statutory
interpretation, but to note that the Court does not approach statutes on those
terms, or at least does not do so explicitly. If anything, Manning’s
assessment might understate textualism’s recent strides at the Supreme
Court. The last Court majority to rely on Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States32—the case famous for holding that a statute’s literal textual
meaning must yield in the face of absurd results—predates the fall of the
Berlin Wall.33 The practice of implying private rights of action to effectuate

should cease to advocate for an “aggressive textualism” and instead embrace the moderate
approaches on which scholars and judges have agreed).
27. Id. at 121–22 (arguing that textualists cannot accept the more moderate approaches
suggested by accommodationists such as Professors Molot and Nelson “without ceasing to be
textualists”).
28. But see id. at 119–20 (contrasting the view—shared by Professors Molot and Nelson—that
textualism and intentionalism have generally converged, with his own position that textualists’
adherence to a formalist axiom ensures that “their war with other methods can never cease”).
29. Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1307; id. at 1308 (citing Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568–69 (2005) as exemplifying the new equilibrium).
30. Id. at 1313 n.117 (citing Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 94–99
(2007) and Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 591 (2004)).
31. See generally Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1995) (identifying a new “metademocratic”
conception of statutory interpretation whereby courts assign meaning to contested statutory terms
via interpretive rules designed to produce democratizing effects); Robert Weisberg, The
Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983)
(characterizing Calabresi’s activist conception of judges as artists capable of recasting the law).
32. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
33. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (citing Church of the Holy
Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459). The Court has, however, since invoked the absurdity doctrine to depart
from textual meaning. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) (rejecting
the government’s novel reading of § 692 of the Line Item Veto Act because acceptance of such an
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uncodified legislative intent and promote overarching legislative purposes
has fared only slightly better.34 In fact, one commentator read a recent
Supreme Court opinion as signaling the complete victory of the new
textualism over strong purposivism.35 In Astrue v. Ratliff,36 the Court gave
force to the clear semantic meaning of a term in a fee-shifting statute despite
arguments—grounded in legislative findings and history—that: (i) Congress
would have preferred a different result had it considered that particular
problem; and (ii) that the semantic meaning undercut the statute’s remedial
purpose.37 Justice Sotomayor pressed these points in a concurring opinion
joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsberg, but all three joined Justice
Thomas’s opinion of the Court in full because the textual analysis
“compell[ed] the conclusion.”38
In other words, nine Justices, including the last one to invoke Church of
the Holy Trinity,39 chose objective semantic meaning gleaned from text,
structure, and linguistic canons over policy inferences and an imaginative
reconstruction of what the enacting legislators would have wanted had they
considered the issue.40 Thus, when faced with the choice between semantic
meaning and statutory purpose—Manning’s dividing line between textualism
and purposivism—the Court chose semantic meaning unanimously. In 1991,
a similar question produced a foundational textualist decision, but in a 5–4

interpretation would “produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have
intended”).
34. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (“The judicial task is to interpret
the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private
right but also a private remedy.”); cf. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283–86 (2002)
(foreclosing the plaintiff’s action for violation of a federal statute because the statute did not
manifest an unambiguous intent to create individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
35. Frederick Liu, Astrue v. Ratliff and the Death of Strong Purposivism, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 167, 173 (2011) (“Interpretive consensus on the Supreme Court is not impossible. . . .
If Ratliff is any indication, strong purposivism is dead . . . .”).
36. 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010).
37. Id. at 2530–31 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 2529–30.
39. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 107 n.3 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citing Church of the Holy Trinity to support his position that a literal reading of
statutory text should give way when Congress’s intent as to the precise issue before the Court is
clear).
40. See Liu, supra note 35, at 170 (identifying a legislator’s subjective intent as one of two
kinds of “intent” a court should look for when interpreting statutes). But see Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817
(1983) (arguing that the purposive approach of “imaginative reconstruction” is a model of faithful
agency superior to textualism).
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split with three separate dissents.41 In Astrue, those with misgivings saw no
option but appeal to Congress for textual amendment.42
B.

State Court Statutory Interpretation

If federal disputes about statutory interpretation have stabilized, serious
scholarship about interpretation in the state context has only just begun. This
subpart reviews and synthesizes scholarship on statutory interpretation in
state courts. The subpart focuses on the questions of whether state court
interpretation should differ from federal court interpretation and the
consequent question of whether interpretive method should travel with a
statute across jurisdictional bounds. This growing body of scholarship both
hints at and calls out for a more general framework for thinking about
interpretation in state courts and across jurisdictions.
1. The Jurists.—Until recently, most modern theory on state statutory
interpretation came via state judges’ speeches later reprinted in the host
institutions’ law reviews. These works flag potential points of difference
between state and federal court interpretation, such as state courts’ general
common law powers and the relevant similarities and differences in state and
federal constitutional structures. These arguments, however, raise as many
questions as they answer about state court interpretation.
The leading example of this genre is a lecture by Judith Kaye as chief
judge of the New York Court of Appeals.43 The touchstone of her argument
for state court divergence is the fact that state courts “are the keepers of the
common law.”44 Even in an age of statutes, state courts, unlike federal courts
of limited jurisdiction, retain general common law powers.45 Because of this,
Judge Kaye argues, state law is a complex tapestry of common law and
statute, making the court an interlocutor with the legislature, not just a
passive interpreter of statutory commands.46 This “common-law method
compels courts” to depart from a statute’s plain meaning when doing so leads

41. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101–03 (1991) (holding, based on
plain language, that a federal statute conveyed no authority to shift expert fees, but with Justices
Marshall and Stevens dissenting on the grounds that statutory interpretation should also involve
extratextual considerations).
42. See Astrue, 130 S. Ct. at 2533 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Bartlett v. Strickland,
556 U.S. 1, 44 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) (“While I join the Court’s opinion and agree with
its textual analysis, the foregoing persuades me that the practical effect of our decision ‘severely
undermines the [statute’s] estimable aim . . . . The Legislature has just cause to clarify beyond
debate’ whether this effect is one it actually intends.”).
43. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading
Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1995).
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id. at 20 (citing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) and Tex. Indus.,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–42 (1981)).
46. See id. at 20–26 (describing the state legislative/judicial dialogue and surveying instances of
legislative–judicial give-and-take).
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to absurd results.47 To bring this back to Manning’s dichotomy, Kaye argues
that her court’s common law powers and tradition allow it to choose broader
purpose over semantic meaning when the two conflict.
Judge Kaye does not point to specific examples on how a state and
federal court might rule differently when faced with a similar statutory
problem.48 That said, her emphasis on the legitimacy of the state court’s role
in law and policy development suggests that her comparative target is federal
textualism.49 It is also not clear that she believes federal courts are barred
from applying the common law method in statutory interpretation. If
anything, her approving citations to federal scholars like William Eskridge,
Daniel Farber, and Philip Frickey suggest the contrary.50 In this light, a state
court’s common law powers (as opposed to method) may be a sufficient and
additional justification for the dialogic purposivism she advances, but not a
necessary feature.51
Connecticut State Supreme Court Justice Ellen A. Peters also addresses
state statutory interpretation in her work distinguishing the state and federal
traditions of separation of powers.52 As with Judge Kaye, Justice Peters
invokes the state court’s common law powers, claiming them as an
interpretive resource that federal courts lack.53 Again like Judge Kaye,
Justice Peters also is ambivalent on whether this cashes out in any
methodological differences for state and federal judges facing similar
statutory problems. She claims that “[m]ost state court judges, like most
federal judges,” hold the “mainstream view” rejecting federal textualism.54
Although Peters notes other differences in the separation of powers in the
states, she does not offer a strong link between them and an approach to
statutory interpretation.55
47. Id. at 26.
48. She does note, however, that state courts have less access to legislative history than federal
courts. Id. at 29–30. This difference appears to have narrowed in recent years. Gluck,
Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1829 n.301, 1859 n.398.
49. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 9–11 (rejecting as a canard criticism of “judicial activism”).
50. For example, Kaye cites Eskridge alone twelve times. Id. at 19 nn.106–08, 22 n.119, 23
n.124, 29 n.165, 30 n.167, 33 n.182, 34 n.185.
51. See Eric Lane, How to Read a Statute in New York: A Response to Judge Kaye and Some
More, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 85, 86–87 (1999) (arguing that both federal and state courts use the
“common law” method of interpretation Kaye describes).
52. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State
Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543 (1997).
53. Id. at 1555–56.
54. Id. at 1555.
55. See id. at 1555–64 (detailing various differences between federal and state separation of
powers and giving examples of their effect on statutory construction and on the day-to-day
functioning of state courts, but failing to give a definitive link); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson &
Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1081–82, 1085 (1991) (observing that some state supreme courts offer
advisory opinions, some state judges sit on law reform committees, and some informally lobby
legislators); cf. Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 117, 128 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (finding “no
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Michigan Supreme Court Justice Robert Young, Jr., by contrast,
embraces federal-style textualism and criticizes Judge Kaye’s approach to
statutory interpretation.56 He argues that statutory interpretation is “not a
branch of common-law exegesis” because the separation of powers requires
the court to respect the legislature’s expressed intent.57 Like many federal
textualists, Young would employ semantic canons, consult a limited set of
nontextual sources, be suspicious of legislative history, and look beyond
expressed intent only when a statute is ambiguous.58 In doing so, he rejects
the absurdity doctrine and notes that the Michigan Supreme Court only
invokes particularly reliable forms of legislative history.59
Justice Young’s approach tracks the faithful-agent equilibrium
identified in federal practice.60 Although he discusses a substantial amount
of textualist Michigan precedent, he does not distinguish the federal and state
contexts at the level of principle. His embrace of textualism on grounds that
“ours is a constitutional republic” does not specifically refer to the
constitution of either Michigan or the United States.61 Presumably, the
notions of legislative supremacy and separation of powers in Michigan that
underwrite Justice Young’s theory of statutory interpretation are no different
than their federal counterparts, resulting in a unified methodology.
2. The Scholars.—The judges’ writings offer kernels of arguments
about federal–state divergence: the significance of state courts’ general
common law powers; the significance of distinct separation of powers
arrangements; and, by contrast, the potential irrelevance of common law
powers in the face of federal–state parallels in the judicial role and
constitutional structure. According to recent accounts of litigated cases,
moreover, many state judges assume that federal law and scholarship on

insurmountable legal obstacles to useful interaction between judges and legislators in the
development of good policies” if there are “clear distinctions as to whether a judge speaks for the
institutional concerns of the judicial branch, for the personal interests of judges as a group, or as an
individual citizen”).
56. See Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts Justice Brennan’s School of
Judicial Philosophy, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 263, 268–69 (2008) (criticizing Judge Kaye’s
judicial philosophy, which views judges as having a “responsibility” to reshape society and to
interpret statutes based on “perception[s] of the ‘common good,’” as an “unfortunately . . .
commonplace” notion); see also Lane, supra note 51, at 86–87 (challenging Judge Kaye’s
description of common law interpretive methods because she limits its reach to state courts and
arguing instead that differences in interpretive methods do not align by jurisdiction but rather by
“individual judicial sensibilities”).
57. Young, supra note 56, at 280.
58. Id. at 280–82.
59. Id. at 281–82.
60. The Michigan Supreme Court, however, has not explicitly repudiated the absurdity
doctrine, and Young’s parsimony in identifying ambiguity may be stricter than current Michigan
Supreme Court practice. See id. (finding statutes ambiguous if their provisions are in irreconcilable
conflict or if competing interpretations are in equipoise).
61. Id. at 280.
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statutory interpretation translate well to the state context.62 Absent further
judicial development, it falls to scholars to explore questions of comparative
methodology. Yet even when the explosion of writing about statutory
interpretation was at its apex, few considered such questions.63 Even Robert
Summers, one of the greatest comparativists in statutory interpretation,
focused almost exclusively on Supreme Court decisions for his chapter on
American methodology in a volume on comparative statutory interpretation.64
In the past five years, however, a handful of scholars began to take state
interpretive methodology seriously. The earliest work hewed close to federal
matters. Professor Alex Long, for example, considered interpretation of state
discrimination statutes that parallel federal law.65 He concluded that interests
of judicial integrity, legislative efficiency, and respect for legislative intent
recommend that state courts presumptively follow federal interpretations.66
Professor Anthony J. Bellia then studied state court interpretations of federal
statutes in the post-Ratification era.67 There, Bellia asked whether state
courts applied the doctrine known as the “equity of the statute” when
interpreting federal statutes.68 This common law doctrine allows courts to
depart from a statute’s clear text in light of the reason or “equity” of the
legislation—either by extending the statute’s applicability beyond its scope
but within its purpose or by restricting the scope of a statute when the text
applies to a matter but the purpose does not.69 Bellia found state courts
invoking the doctrine for state statutes while not equitably interpreting

62. See Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1858 (observing that state courts “do not see
institutional differences as substantial enough to pose barriers to the exchange of theory” between
state and federal interpretive tools).
63. William Popkin is an early exception. Yet in both his general theorizing and his close study
of a state court’s opinions, his work assumes that state and federal cases are interchangeable for
purposes of his theoretical analysis. See William D. Popkin, Statutory Interpretation in State
Courts—A Study of Indiana Opinions, 24 IND. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1991) (arguing that “[t]wo of
the issues prominent in contemporary literature [on statutory interpretation] can be profitably
explored in the context of state cases”). See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT:
THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999) (providing a historical
analysis of the evolution of statutory interpretation at the state and federal levels). This may be true,
but, as we will see later, not obviously so.
64. Robert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation in the United States, in INTERPRETING
STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 407, 407 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds.,
1991).
65. Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations of State
and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 475–76 (2006).
66. Id. at 476.
67. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes,
59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1529–52 (2006) (analyzing the practices of state courts in interpreting
federal statutes from 1789 to 1820).
68. Id. at 1547.
69. Id. at 1508–09; see also John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29–36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the
origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
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federal statutes.70 He ascribed this difference to the Supremacy Clause’s
limitation on state courts’ federal lawmaking and its requirement of
uniformity in federal law.71 Equitable interpretation, Bellia explained, would
contravene both requirements in the federal context.72
Professor Abbe Gluck has recently taken up the question of state court
interpretation more generally. In her first work, Gluck studied interpretation
in five states and identified a three-step interpretive approach she calls
“modified textualism”—a method she claims is the controlling interpretative
approach in the states studied.73 Gluck finds this coalescence important
because it shows that, unlike the conclusions put forward by many federal
commentators, courts can agree on an interpretive method and treat it as a
binding framework, even in the face of legislation to the contrary.74 This
consensus, Gluck argues, indicates that statutory methodology can itself be a
form of law.75 Gluck’s second work asks whether interpretive methodology
travels with a statute across jurisdictional lines.76 Gluck finds an erratic
federal practice, in which federal courts reading state statutes often ignore
state interpretive methods.77 She argues that, under Erie, a federal court
interpreting a state statute should apply the state’s method—such as modified
textualism—if the state’s courts consider that approach to be binding law.78
Finally, Professors Aaron-Andrew Bruhl and Ethan Leib have examined
the implications of one notable difference between state and federal courts:
the fact that most state court judges are elected.79 They argue that elections
should not matter in cases without valence in popular opinion or in cases
easily resolved by traditional tools of interpretation.80 By contrast, electoral
accountability and its accompanying political knowledge may justify a more
active judicial role interpreting legislation that (a) reflects stale popular

70. Bellia, supra note 67, at 1506–07. Bellia also notes that equitable interpretation of state
statutes was increasingly less favorable as courts began to focus on legislative intent. Id. at 1507.
71. Id. at 1548–52.
72. Id. at 1552.
73. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1758. “Modified textualism” looks first to text, then
legislative history, and then substantive canons. A court proceeds to the next step only if the prior
leaves the question unresolved. Id.
74. See id. at 1787–91 (describing the Texas textualist courts’ defiance of legislated rules of
interpretation).
75. See id. at 1757–58 (arguing that state court practice “challenge[s] the prevailing theoretical
resistance to [methodological consistency] and highlight[s] the possibility that [courts] might be
receptive to consistent methodological frameworks”); id. at 1862 (“Is methodology ‘law’? The
Supreme Court does not act as if it is. The state courts studied here appear to conclude otherwise.”).
76. Gluck, Intersystemic, supra note 9, at 1901.
77. Id. at 1905.
78. See id. at 1990–91 (arguing that the underpinnings of Erie point to the conclusion that state
statutory questions should be decided by federal courts under state interpretive methodology or else
deviations should be justified).
79. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79
U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1215 (2012).
80. Id. at 1255–57.
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preferences, (b) reflects special interests rather than popular preferences, or
(c) violates minority rights in ways that are otherwise constitutional.81 In this
respect, Bruhl and Leib suggest that state courts are better situated than
federal courts to engage in statutory updating of the kind advocated by some
federal scholars.82
3. Moving Forward.—Widening the focus beyond the federal context
also reveals what I call the divergence question: whether state courts should
read their statutes as federal courts read statutes. Some scholarship has
begun to explore parts of this large question, but even though these initial
efforts are few, they adopt a dizzying array of lenses. State court judges, for
example, point to common law powers and constitutional structure as
possible points of departure.83 Similarly, although Bellia examined state
interpretation for its implications on federal practice, his emphasis on
constitutional norms suggests that interpretation of state statutes could be
distinct due to differences in federal and state constitutional structures.84
Long’s work focused only on discrimination statutes tracking federal law, but
his analysis of the benefits of uniform interpretation may point to a broader
argument about the desirability of interpretive divergence or convergence in
general.85 In particular, he points to complying with legislative preferences,
promoting legislative efficiency, and preserving the reputation of the state
judiciaries and moral authority of the Supreme Court.86 Bruhl and Leib’s
argument for the difference elections make in state interpretation considers
other variables, such as institutional competence, democratic legitimacy, and
pragmatic considerations.87 It is fair, even at this early point, to ask how
these varying approaches interrelate and what they might be missing.
This possibility of divergence raises the second matter—the
intersystemic question—about how to negotiate interpretation of statutes
across jurisdictional lines. Gluck focuses on this second question, but shows
ambivalence about the first. Both of her major works depend on interpretive
divergence: The state court textualism she first identifies is “new” and
“modified” compared to federal textualism.88 The Erie question in statutory
interpretation she addresses in her second work is most pressing only if state
and federal courts adopt different methodologies—otherwise a federal court
facing an open question of state statutory law would get to work much as it

81. Id. at 1258–67.
82. Id.
83. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 20–26; Peters, supra note 52, at 1555–56.
84. Bellia, supra note 67, at 1548–52 (discussing the effect the Supremacy Clause has on state
interpretations of federal statutes).
85. See Long, supra note 65, at 476 (arguing for a presumption towards uniform construction
when interpreting similar statutory language).
86. Id. at 507.
87. Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1223–30.
88. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1758.
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would in ordinary course. Yet sometimes Gluck identifies potential sources
of state–federal divergence only to downplay their relevance compared to
cross-jurisdictional similarities.89 The source of this tension, it seems, is a
desire to establish the relevance of state court practice to the federal context
and vice versa.90 Gluck’s claim of relevance seems correct, though it may
hold even if there are substantial differences in the two contexts.
While Gluck’s recognition of state–federal divergence does not require
her to explain or justify it, this gap in the analysis may weaken confidence in
the broader lessons she draws about interpretation more generally. Knowing
whether and why state court interpretation should diverge from federal
interpretation can shed light on whether interpretative method is in fact
“law,” what kind of “law” it is, and whether other tribunals are bound to
respect it.91 For example, Gluck’s invocation of Erie treats interpretive
method as a kind of positive, judge-made state law.92 This understanding,
however plausible, conflicts with practice in the very courts she studies.93
These courts, as Gluck notes, repeatedly resist statutes that attempt to dictate
interpretive methods to courts.94 Aside from lawless intransigence, such
resistance could suggest that courts treat interpretive method not as
displaceable common law in the positivistic sense, but rather as a form of
constitutional law.95 Or it may suggest a belief that methods of interpreting
statutes cannot be legislated any more effectively than the methods for
understanding ordinary English.96 These options—and their underlying reasons for interpretive divergence or convergence—may lead to very different
answers to the intersystemic question.
This Article seeks to make progress on the divergence question while
also shedding light on the intersystemic question. It does so by addressing a

89. See, e.g., id. at 1858–59 (“I do not wish to understate the extent of potential intersystemic
differences . . . . But there are at least two reasons why the states seem right not to allow these
differences to prevent comparisons . . . . First, the most often noted differences between state and
federal governments do not seem to be doing much work here.”).
90. See id. at 1861 (“[I]nstitutional differences should not be used as a reason to discount the
relevance of state court legisprudence for federal statutory interpretation . . . .”).
91. See id. at 1862 n.409 (explaining that discovery of state methodology raises the related
reverse-Erie questions she addresses in the second part of her project).
92. See, e.g., Gluck, Intersystemic, supra note 9, at 1990 (observing that if federal courts apply
state methodology, “it should be because . . . a sovereign’s court chooses to apply them, not because
they are ready to be plucked from the sky”).
93. See Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1862 (“Is methodology ‘law’? . . . The state
courts studied here appear to conclude otherwise.”).
94. Id. at 1755–56, 1785–98.
95. Such a result might also trigger an Erie-like rule for federal courts. But see Bruhl & Leib,
supra note 79, at 1268–69 (noting that the challenges of “crossover” interpretation possibly could
“generate good reasons to reject interpretive divergence”).
96. Cf. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory
Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 100 (2003) (“[I]f the goal
is to understand the intentions of authors and speakers, one cannot be artificially constrained by
fixed meanings or rules.”).
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noted but underexplored aspect of the divergence question—the effect a state
court’s common law powers may have on its interpretation of statutes. As
with judicial elections, these general common law powers may distinguish
state courts from their federal counterparts. Unlike judicial elections, existing scholarship does not address the effects of these powers on state courts in
a systemic fashion. The following analysis introduces the prospect of
interpretive divergence due to a court’s common law powers.
II.

Approaching Statutes as “Keepers of the Common Law”

A state court’s broad common law powers offer an intriguing point of
comparison. At the threshold, analyzing the effect of state courts’ common
law powers may mitigate the dangers of comparing state courts in gross.
Nearly every state court understands itself to possess some common law
power, even after substantial movements for codification.97 Courts may have
different understandings about the nature of the common law and its
interaction with statutes,98 but at least here we have a feature that cuts across
almost all states. Furthermore, the fact that state courts are “keepers of the
common law,” as Judge Kaye notes, offers a substantial, systemic contrast
with the federal system.99 Even many who accept the legitimacy of federal
common law understand it to exist in limited enclaves, compared to the more
expansive common law powers of state courts.100
This Part lays out a prima facie case for why a state court’s broader
common law powers could justify a different approach to statutes than in
federal courts. For a comparative baseline, I will assume federal courts
incline toward textualism, a possible oversimplification that nevertheless
captures the thrust of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the past
decade.101 So put, the primary question is whether state courts have more
flexibility in their treatment of their statutes than federal-style textualism
affords. This Part draws on state court commentary and on broader theories
of statutory interpretation to make a case for why that should be so.

97. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 6 (highlighting the integral role the common law plays in
decision making at the state court level). A possible exception is Louisiana, whose civil law
tradition separates it from other common law jurisdictions, though the practical difference of its
civil law frame is contested. See J.-R. Trahan, The Continuing Influence of le Droit Civil and el
Derecho Civil in the Private Law of Louisiana, 63 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1053–55 (2003) (chronicling
the purported decline of the civil law system in Louisiana and subsequent attempts by the Louisiana
legislature and law schools to reverse the trend in the mid-twentieth century).
98. For a fascinating discussion on this, see Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1126–27 & nn.88–90 (2011).
99. Kaye, supra note 43, at 6.
100. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 2, at 758–59 (“The relatively freewheeling era of federal
judicial lawmaking (akin to that of a state common law court) to ‘fill in the gaps’ in a federal
statutory regime . . . is long gone. Most writers now posit a narrower sphere for judge-made
common law.” (footnote omitted)).
101. See supra subpart I(A).
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The Importance of Common Law Powers

State jurists like Judge Kaye and Justice Peters who seek to separate
state court statutory interpretation from federal textualism refer to the
“common law” nature of their courts.102 The state jurists’ invocation of the
“common law” is a broad one and it pays to winnow down that appellation to
see what most plausibly distinguishes state and federal practice.
For example, Judge Kaye notes that state statutes codify common law
causes of action and abrogate common law doctrines.103 Federal legislation,
however, also incorporates common law concepts and textualists have no
problem reading such statutes in that light.104 Federal statutes also abrogate
judicial decisions at the intersection of common and statutory law.105 As
Lilly Ledbetter’s experience attests, Kaye’s reliance on the fact that the “state
legislative/judicial relationship often takes the form of an open dialogue”106
is also not a significant ground for distinguishing state and federal practice.107
The same holds for Kaye’s emphasis of provisions of state statutes that are
often unclear and require judicial elaboration.108 Proponents of both
expansive and restrictive approaches to federal common law regard this
interpretive leeway as a kind of common law, and a legitimate form at that.109
102. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 6 (describing state courts as the “keepers of the common
law”); Peters, supra note 52, at 1155–56 (contrasting the large body of common law available to
assist state courts in statutory construction with the much smaller amount of available federal
common law).
103. Kaye, supra note 43, at 20–21.
104. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613–15 (2009)
(reading CERCLA liability apportionment in light of common law tort principles); see also Frank
Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1913, 1913–14
(1999) (reading the common law defense of necessity into a criminal statute silent on that matter);
John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1648, 1656 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Deriving Rules] (discussing textualists’ application
of common law principles and terminology when construing a statute); Caleb Nelson, The
Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 521–25 (2006) (cataloging the incorporation
of common law concepts in the interpretation of statutes).
105. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (describing the
congressional override of a decision holding that a statute abrogated the common law distinction
between employees and independent contractors).
106. Kaye, supra note 43, at 23.
107. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (asking Congress to override the majority’s interpretation); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (overriding Ledbetter because of its impairment of statutory
protections); see also Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2533 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(calling on Congress to clarify its statutory language).
108. Kaye, supra note 43, at 27–29, 32–34.
109. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983)
(“[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common
law . . . .”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
34–35 (1985) (discussing how the Supreme Court has sometimes ignored evidence of specific
intention when construing vague statutory or constitutional provisions); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S.
Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 331–32 (1980)
(concluding that a court serves the same function when engaging in statutory interpretation as it
does when acting in a common law capacity).

496

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:479

Kaye also observes that challenging questions of statutory interpretation may
require degrees of lawyerly skill, judgment, and creativity equal to those
required for judging the arc of common law precedent.110 Yet modern
textualists do not claim that each statutory provision has a clear meaning.111
To be sure, some textualists see less interpretive uncertainty than others, but
they also advocate deference to administrative interpretation of unclear
statutes because agencies are better equipped to make law through such
decisions.112 This gap-filling form of “common law” arising out of statutory
vagueness or ambiguity does not brightly distinguish state and federal
interpretation.
A more plausible point of common law differentiation is a state court’s
broad power to create and change law in areas where the legislature has not
spoken at all, as opposed to having spoken unclearly.113 Federal courts are
less frequently seen creating common law actions, abandoning contributory
negligence in favor of comparative fault,114 newly recognizing living wills,115
or updating common law rules in light of scientific advances.116 By contrast,
state courts, as Judge Kaye notes, can do so on their own initiative when the

110. Kaye, supra note 43, at 27–29.
111. See Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J.) (“An ambiguous legal rule does not have a single ‘right’ meaning; there is a range
of possible meanings; the selection from the range is an act of policymaking.”); Manning, What
Divides, supra note 15, at 75 (observing that because modern textualists understand that the
meaning of statutory language is dependent on context, they realize that the distinction between
statutory text and congressional purpose is not always clear); Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra
note 19, at 2408 (noting that textualists acknowledge that all statutory language is at least somewhat
open-ended).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing for broad deference to the interpretations of the administrative agency charged with
enforcing the statute); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4 (2006) (contending that the legal system is at its best when
the interpretation of an ambiguous statute is left to an administrative agency).
113. This argument assumes that state constitutions vest in or impliedly reserve for the judiciary
general common law powers. Common law powers in many states might be understood as
legislative grants via reception statutes that incorporate common law not inconsistent with state law.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.04.010 (West 2005). This might limit a court’s prerogative.
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 346 (1992) (citing
reception statutes as legislative justification for state common law). Yet courts often treated these
statutes as merely declaratory of existing judicial powers. See Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An
Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 804 (1951) (noting that “where
the passage of a reception statute came later in the development of a state or territory, it was deemed
to be declaratory of existing law”).
114. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 21 (discussing the judicial adoption of comparative fault by
state courts). The Supreme Court will, however, make such changes in enclaves of federal common
law, such as admiralty jurisdiction. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411
(1975) (abandoning the “divided damages” rule in admiralty jurisdiction in favor of comparative
fault).
115. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 25 (noting New York Court of Appeals’ willingness to
recognize the concept of a living will without legislative action).
116. See id. (referencing the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s decision to overrule the
common law “year and a day” rule in homicide prosecutions).
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legislature has not acted.117 It is this prerogative form of common
lawmaking—as opposed to delegated lawmaking power—that raises the
most substantial difference between the common law powers of state and
federal courts.118 Accordingly, Judge Kaye claims that this prerogative also
allows state courts to work with statutes in a nontextualist fashion. She
claims that sometimes the “common-law method” requires “plain meaning”
to yield to “common-sense and substantial justice.”119 By contrast, federal
textualists reject purposive or equitable interpretation. Similarly, advocates
of common law differentiation will apply a statute beyond the fair
construction of its textual terms when doing so comports with the purpose of
the statute.120 This filling of the casus omissus—treating an omitted statutory
subject as included by analogy121—conflicts with the federal textualist’s
commitment to respecting the limits to which the legislature chose to pursue
a given end.122
The challenging question, however, is how a court’s freestanding
common law prerogative changes the way in which that court should read or
use statutes. Absent more argument about how to understand and integrate
common law and statutes, it is not clear how judicial power to expound
common law amid statutory silence also entails power to expand or contract
legislative handiwork.123 The task then, is to identify arguments that support
the intuition that common law powers affect interpretive method. The
following subparts begin that exploration.

117. Id.
118. See Merrill, supra note 113, at 347 (arguing that state reception statutes confer broad
prerogative/common lawmaking powers on state courts).
119. Kaye, supra note 43, at 26.
120. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 31 (quoting Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common
Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 405 (1968) [hereinafter Traynor, Statutes Revolving])
(hypothesizing a situation where a judge might deem it proper to extend a statutorily created right or
duty to a person not expressly covered by the language of the statute when the extension falls in line
with the purpose of the statute).
121. See Derek Auchie, The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule, 25 STATUTE L.
REV. 40, 41–42 (2004) (discussing the casus omissus rule’s gap-filling role); Hans W. Baade, The
Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 45, 46
(1994) (summarizing the history and development of the differing views of the casus omissus in
civil law and common law systems).
122. See Easterbrook, supra note 109, at 544 (proposing a framework wherein the domain of a
statute should only extend to cases contemplated by the statute’s framers); Manning, SecondGeneration, supra note 12, at 1316 (asserting that textualists believe that judges should “respect the
level of generality at which the legislature expresses its policies”); cf. Auchie, supra note 121, at 42
(explaining that the rule against statutory analogy in England “finds its roots in the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty”).
123. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 370 (1981)
(stating that a court’s power to make law when the legislature has been silent does not imply a
similar ability to alter statutes).
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Statutory Interpretation and the Constitution

Knowing the tenets of theories like textualism and purposivism is
necessary for thinking about statutory interpretation beyond the Supreme
Court. Yet in asking whether state and federal methods should diverge, it
helps to consider reasons for adopting any particular approach. A first lens
for viewing the question of interpretive choice focuses on the interpreter’s
role in the constitutional regime.124 A constitution may impose duties or
limitations on interpreters that affect their approach to legal texts.125 A
constitution could, for example, require or prohibit the judiciary from
considering purpose in the event of semantic textual clarity.126 Attempts to
derive rules of statutory interpretation from the constitution play a prominent
part in federal scholarship and can serve as starting points for analysis in the
state context.127 In fact, constitutional textualists have left open the possibility that arguments for federal textualism may not carry over to the state
context.128 This subpart picks up that thread to explain how some constitutional arguments in the federal context weaken the case for textualism in
state courts when one considers common law powers.129

124. See Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988)
(“Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law.”); Adrian
Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase:
“interpretive choice”). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting
statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this
Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts. See
Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1, 4–5 (2004) (summarizing the factors that justify a divergence in interpretive methods).
125. Here I focus on written constitutions. Unwritten constitutions pose additional questions
and arguably blur into the third category—considerations about the nature of law. Cf. Jeffrey
Goldsworthy, The Myth of the Common Law Constitution, in COMMON LAW THEORY 204, 235–36
(Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007) (describing the legal nature of unwritten constitutions in terms of
official consensus).
126. Cf. Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA (Austl.) (giving preference to
interpretations that would “best achieve the purpose or object of the Act”); id. s 15AB (codifying
permitted use and sources of legislative history).
127. See generally Manning, Deriving Rules, supra note 104 (describing different aspects of the
Constitution that might inform statutory construction).
128. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 28–34 (pointing to the lack of voluminous legislative history
materials and the presence of multiple plausible interpretations of statutes at the state level as
evidence of the greater ability of state courts to use the common law process to make policy
determinations); John Copeland Nagle, The Worst Statutory Interpretation Case in History, 94 NW.
U. L. Rev. 1445, 1468 (2000) (“The received wisdom suggests that state court judges have been
more likely to follow textualist approaches than federal judges, but Popkin offers an insightful
reason for why the opposite should be the case.”).
129. I appreciate the dangers of talking about state constitutions in gross. Nevertheless, state
constitutions also share features, and scholars of state constitutionalism address state separation of
powers questions in general, see, for example, Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the
Separation of Powers: A Venerable Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1457–60
(1998); Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of
Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1238–40 (1999); Robert A. Schapiro,
Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 79, 107–08 (1998); G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions,
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A good starting point is Professor Eskridge’s argument that the original
understanding of the “judicial Power” in Article III of the U.S. Constitution
includes the equitable power to apply statutory provisions in light of statutory
purpose and reason, even when doing so departs from the text’s semantic
meaning.130 This historical argument relies on the practices of English
common law judges between the years 1500–1800, as well as state court
common law judges in the Founding and post-Founding eras.131 Similar
originalist arguments could apply to state courts with even greater force, at
least for judiciary provisions framed around the time of the Founding.132
Further, although Eskridge’s evidence of practice in English and state courts
with common law powers may be irrelevant for arguments about federal
courts of limited jurisdiction,133 this aspect of Eskridge’s originalist case may
be a feature, not a bug, for arguments about state court interpretation.
Differences in constitutional structure may also point away from state
court textualism. Consider the argument for federal textualism based on
constitutional structure. Manning argues that legislation is often a product of
messy and possibly unknowable compromise; that legislative choices about
textual means are significant, for they “reflect the price that the legislature
was willing to pay” to achieve a given end; and that a legislative choice
between rules and standards reflects that important decision about means.134
Overriding clear text in the name of purpose risks upsetting these legislative
compromises and the choices about means that instantiate them. Indeed,
regular repair to purpose could impede compromise, for negotiators would
always face the risk of courts abstracting away particular bargains in light of

59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 340 (2003). But see ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF
AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 238 (2009) (“State constitutional separation of powers questions
also call for a state-specific form of analysis rather than one applying a more generalized, or
universalist, American-constitutional separation of powers doctrine.”). At this stage of the inquiry,
I am content to follow suit of the majority.
130. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1096–98 (2001) (arguing
that interpretations of statutes necessarily encompass nontextual considerations).
131. Id. at 998–1008, 1010–30.
132. Perhaps it is no coincidence that some of the least originalist state courts, such as Kaye’s
New York and Peters’s Connecticut, are charter members of the union.
133. See Manning, Deriving Rules, supra note 104, at 1662–63 (arguing that state judiciaries’
inheritance of general common law powers may have made it more natural for state courts to treat
statutes merely as starting points for further common law reasoning); Manning, Equity of the
Statute, supra note 69, at 30–36 (discussing the origins of the equity of statute doctrine in England
and noting that the English judiciary always felt significant freedom to engage in atextual
interpretation, perhaps because of its significant conflation of lawmaking and judging authority);
see also Bellia, supra note 67, at 1548 (arguing that state courts did not use equitable doctrines in
their interpretation of federal statutes).
134. Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1310–11; see also Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 63–65
(1988) (emphasizing that the legislative process is essentially one of compromise; as such, any
meaningful statutory interpretation must account for the means utilized by the legislature in getting
a particular statute passed).
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general purpose.135 Avoiding such risks, Manning argues, honors the
Constitution’s structural norms.
The bicameralism and presentment
requirements of Article I, Section Seven, the protection of small states in the
Senate, and internal legislative procedures place compromise at the center of
the federal lawmaking process and create a supermajority requirement for
passing legislation, thus giving political minorities the power to block
legislation or exact compromise.136 Article I’s explicit and exclusive vesting
of the legislative power in Congress also weighs against judicial revision of
clear language emerging from such bargains.137
As Part III will discuss, many state constitutional structures also
encourage compromise and separate the legislative and judicial power.
Distinguishing features of state constitutional structure complicate this
picture, however. First, the fact remains that state courts still have inherent
lawmaking power that extends beyond filling gaps and resolving ambiguities
in statutes—they can fashion common law in the absence of statutes.138 The
common law is a central point of contention in disputes between federal
textualists and their critics. Proponents of dynamic statutory interpretation in
federal courts emphasize the persistence of common lawmaking in substance,
if not in name, in ordinary statutory interpretation.139 Similarly, many
scholars who criticize the Supreme Court’s restrictive approach to federal
common law also reject textualism and its formalist approach to separation of
powers.140 The limited, uncertain character of federal common law141

135. See Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1314 (describing, in particular, how
judicial resort to purpose can run the risk of bypassing the compromise-forcing structures that are an
important part of the legislative bargaining process).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1305–06.
138. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 5–6 (“The common law is, of course, lawmaking and
policymaking by judges. It is law derived not from authoritative texts such as constitutions and
statutes, but from human wisdom collected case by case . . . . That state courts—not federal
courts—are the keepers of the common law has long been American orthodoxy.” (footnotes
omitted)). Many state courts also have legislative power to regulate court procedure and discipline
the bar; moreover, some trial-level courts act like executive agencies in administering social
services in family and drug courts. Cf. Peters, supra note 52, at 1554–55, 1561–62 (noting first that,
in Connecticut and Minnesota, the legislature and judiciary occasionally clash over control of court
procedure, and second that, in Connecticut, judicial officers often serve in a social-service capacity
in family and drug courts).
139. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 383 (1990) (arguing that statutory interpretation is
“fundamentally similar to judicial lawmaking in the areas of constitutional law and common law”);
Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 225–26 (1999) (arguing
that a fundamental commitment to a system of precedent is incompatible with the view that courts’
only legitimate role in statutory interpretation is to seek textual meaning, because the reality of any
common law system means that any judicial determination regarding a statute will affect that
statute’s subsequent interpretation).
140. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE L. REV. 303,
317 (1992) (rejecting the Supreme Court’s stance that federal common law violates the separation
of powers, and instead embracing the view that federal common law operates to effect congressional
intent); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 274–76
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presents an obstacle to such arguments, however. The leitmotif of Justice
Scalia’s prominent defense of textualism is how federal courts are not
common law courts—a tune Justice Young reprises in his defense of
textualism in state courts.142 Such objections fall away for state courts,
which are undisputedly common law courts. The Supreme Court’s
parsimonious understanding of federal common law may relieve federal
textualists from considering the implications of general common law powers
on statutory interpretation. State court jurists have no such dispensation.
In considering this point, it is also worth noting that most state judges
are elected or face executive reappointment.143 This feature of state
constitutional law originated in a wave of constitutional reform aimed at
weakening powerful legislatures beholden to special interests.144 Along with
this broader aim of shifting power from the legislature to “the people,” the
embrace of judicial elections eliminated legislative appointment and
reappointment in the hopes that the judiciary would check powerful, factiondriven legislatures by “protect[ing] property and individual rights.”145 Of
course, judicial independence often connotes separation from politics, but
one might understand judicial elections today as creating a politically
accountable, policy-making corrective to legislative dysfunction.146 If so,
this could suggest a state law form of dynamic interpretation that links the

(1992) (criticizing the view that the text of the Constitution can be read to establish a strict
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches); Louise Weinberg, Federal
Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 838–42 (1989) (arguing that a narrow view of federal
common law—which purports to respect principles of separation of powers—instead reflects an
unrealistic assessment of the nature of the judicial process, legal realism, and the character of
American federalism). But cf. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507–12 (1988)
(Scalia, J.) (authoring an opinion creating a federal common tort law defense).
141. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (disavowing federal
common law rule-making authority).
142. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 13 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Young, supra note 56, at 281
(advancing the argument for textualism on the grounds that courts have no responsibility, absent
constitutional violations, to remake poor legislative policy choices).
143. Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1217 n.1, 1253 n.149.
144. WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 285. This reform movement also strengthened and gave
independence to executive offices, citizen ballot initiatives and referenda, and procedural rules
limiting legislative discretion.
See James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State
Constitutional Tradition, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 820 (1991) (discussing the introduction of new
institutional devices, including the secret ballot, the initiative, and the referendum).
145. WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 285; cf. Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 69, at
67–70 (discounting evidence of equitable interpretation in earlier periods because relevant courts
were subject to legislative control).
146. Originalists might suspect this inference to be anachronistic. Advocates for judicial
elections argued that the process would be best suited to select competent and impartial judges.
Early advocates and opponents of judicial elections often shared a pre-legal realist understanding of
the judge as an apolitical oracle or technician. Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly
Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
190, 210–13 (1993).
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common law tradition with political accountability to weave “common and
statutory law . . . together in a complex fabric.”147
In short, prerogative common law powers blur the separation of the
legislative and judicial branches in state government as compared to in the
federal Constitution. In general, this is an important datum for one seeking
to derive interpretive principles from the Constitution. In particular, if
equitable interpretation comes part and parcel with common law powers,
many state courts undisputedly can claim these—and a measure of political
legitimacy—in ways that federal courts might not.
C.

Statutory Interpretation and Institutional Competence

A second, more empirical perspective on interpretive choice calibrates
interpretive method with the practical competences of the interpreter. An
adherent of the “institutional turn”148 in interpretation first identifies or
assumes a value or set of values, identifies the relevant interpreter, and then
asks what interpretive methods are most likely to promote the desired values,
given the interpreter’s competences. Pure arguments from institutional
competence assume that the Constitution does not mandate any particular
approach to statutes, or at least permits interpretive choice along these
lines.149
1. Institutional Arguments in Federal Scholarship.—Scholars have used
institutional approaches to underwrite an array of interpretive methods.
Professor Caleb Nelson grounds textualism in the belief that a rule-like
approach to finding legislative intent will lead to fewer errors than reliance
on legislative history or imaginative reconstruction.150 Professor Adrian
Vermeule is perhaps the most thoroughgoing institutional advocate of
textualism. He argues that the federal judiciary’s institutional limits recommend “wooden” interpretation that hews closely to the surface meaning of
147. Kaye, supra note 43, at 20 (quoting David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory
Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 937 (1992)); see also Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1258–
59 (claiming that state judicial elections may legitimize updating statutory interpretation); Mashaw,
supra note 124, at 1690; Popkin, supra note 63, at 194–97 (describing the republican statutory
interpretation movement). But see Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in
Governance: Vive La Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1286 (2005) (“I reject the
thoughtless notion that a judge on an elective court should approach a legal issue differently from an
appointed colleague in a neighboring state.”).
148. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV.
885, 886 (2003).
149. See VERMEULE, supra note 112, at 33 (noting that decisions pertaining to interpretive
methodology must necessarily be institutional because the Constitution cannot be read as suggesting
one interpretive method over another).
150. Nelson, supra note 23, at 377, 403–16; see Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and
the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 254–56 (supporting textual
statutory interpretation methods on the basis that the plain meaning of the text provides some
common ground upon which individuals with divergent interests and abilities can approach a
problem).
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the particular clause in question.151 Because judges cannot know whether
rules or standards generally lead to better empirical results, courts should
always choose rules in particular cases to minimize decision costs without
losing expected accuracy.152 For this reason, he concludes that a minimalist
rule of plain meaning should trump background purpose or inferences from
statutory structure and related statutes.153
Not all institutional arguments conclude in textualism. The regime
textualism sought to displace—the purposivism of the Legal Process
School—anchored its approach in the competences of various legal
institutions.154 In fact, the current institutionalism in interpretive theory
seems a direct descendent of the Legal Process.155 If so, institutional
textualism does not oppose Hart and Sacks in principle, but rather disagrees
with the purposive conclusions the Legal Process thinkers drew from their
institutional assessment. Similarly, Judge Posner’s defense of purposive
interpretation points to the advantage courts have in smoothing the rough
edges of blunt statutory rules.156 In theory, legislative amendment exists to
cure absurd or over- and under-inclusive mischief in statutory language, but
given the familiar costs and hurdles of legislative action, judicial reliance on
legislative amendment is either foolish or mulish. Imaginative reconstruction
of congressional intent in particular situations, the argument goes, is far more
likely to promote legislative intent than waiting for legislative intervention.157
2. Institutional Competence and Common Law Powers.—The analysis
below considers plausible goals an interpreter would seek to achieve through
interpretation and then asks, in light of those goals, how the addition of
general common law powers should change what courts do with statutes.

151. VERMEULE, supra note 112, at 4.
152. See, e.g., id. at 192–93 (discussing the high costs of using legislative history relative to the
indeterminate benefits it provides).
153. See, e.g., id. at 202–05 (concluding that enquiry beyond plain meaning provides little
value and advocating for agency deference, as agencies are better suited than courts to delve into
sources of collateral evidence regarding specific statutes). Such a “satisficing” approach “searches
among options or choices until, but only until, one is found that meets preset aspiration level—until,
but only until, the choice is ‘good enough,’” as opposed to best or optimal. Id. at 176–77.
154. See Jeff A. King, Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 409, 422–23 (2008) (describing the theories of the members of the Legal Process School that
involved institutional competences).
155. See id. (linking the work of Vermeule and Sunstein with the Legal Process scholarship of
Hart, Sacks, and Fuller).
156. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes
and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189–90 (1986).
157. See Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 608
(1996) (arguing that judges should imaginatively reconstruct legislative intent when the statute must
be applied to situations the legislators did not foresee); Posner, supra note 40, at 817–18 (arguing
that the judge should try to “imagine how [the enacting legislators] would have wanted the statute
applied to the case at bar”).
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a. Historical Legislative Intent.—A common aim of statutory
interpretation is giving effect to what the legislature intended at the time of
enactment.158 Here, general common law powers seem to offer only modest
improvements in competence. If, as a matter of fact, common law concepts
suffuse state statutes more than in federal legislation, a common law court
may be more adept at inferring what the legislature meant in those instances.
Accordingly, state judges may be more accurate in identifying an intended
meaning that departs from a reasonably clear semantic meaning. But this
also seems to say more about the mix of concepts in statutes than interpretive
method itself.
This is not to deny other institutional differences between state and
federal courts along this axis. Compared to federal judges, state court judges
are more likely to consult legislative drafting, to have held political office
themselves (perhaps at the time of passage), or to have greater familiarity
with the workings of the state legislature.159 These facts may increase a state
judge’s accuracy in assessing a majority of the legislature’s actual or
counterfactual intent. Nevertheless, while intent skepticism could be less
justified in state courts, those institutional differences have little to do with
being a keeper of the common law tradition.
b. Present Legislative Intent or Political Preferences.—Others
argue that statutes should be interpreted to respect existing political
preferences, whether they are reflected in the existing makeup of the
legislature or the population more generally.160 Here, the traditional idea of
the common law reflecting social custom or shared communal
understandings may support the notion that state courts better feel the pulse
of the polity. Professor Eisenberg’s claim that all common law doctrine turns

158. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1479–80 (1987).
159. See G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN
STATE AND NATION 55 (1988) (“[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one
nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such
offices.”); Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 55, at 1081–82, 1085 (noting that “[j]udges . . .
participate in the formulation of proposed legislative policy through [formal] mechanisms” and
informal mechanisms); Linde, supra note 147, at 1286 (explaining that elective state court members
are more likely to have had legislative experience than the Supreme Court members and that judges
in smaller states often consult with state legislators); Peters, supra note 52, at 1561 (observing that
“[f]ederal courts . . . have much more limited opportunities to participate in institutional
interventions” than state courts).
160. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 54–56 (1982)
(insisting that “inconsistent, unprincipled, or preferential treatment” in lawmaking should be
respected so long as it represents the wishes of the current majorities or coalitions of minorities and
is constitutional); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20,
61 (1988) (proposing a “nautical theory” that would “treat statutes as if they were enacted
yesterday”); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2027, 2034 (2002) (supporting the proposition that judges should be constrained to maximize the
extent to which statutory results accurately reflect the political preferences accepted in society).
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on congruence with “social propositions”161 suggests that sensitivity to
popular norms is part of the daily work of a common law jurist in the way
that it may not be for a federal judge. If common law practice offers a state
court judge a more accurate gauge of societal norms than a federal judge can
access, arguments over whether statutory “updating” is undemocratic or
undermines legislative supremacy may be different in the state context.
Again, we find that different institutional considerations may bolster the
claim of state court divergence. As Bruhl and Leib argue, the fact that many
state judges face elections might—at least in some kinds of cases—give state
judges an advantage over federal courts in identifying when contemporary
popular preferences have outgrown text or historical intent.162 One could
make similar points about the fact that many judges face reappointment or
are otherwise plugged in to state politics in ways that many federal judges are
not.163
c. Good Policy.—A person assessing an interpretive methodology
may consider not just faithful agency to statutory drafters or to contemporary
opinion, but also desirable substantive results. We can ask which interpretive
method is likely to produce the most good, however defined. If we think of
the common law courts simply as bodies with general powers to make law
through adjudication, state courts may have competence advantages over
their federal court counterparts—advantages that may justify a more
purposive or dynamic role in shaping policy via statutory interpretation.
In making the normative judgments that accompany shaping doctrine in
fields like tort, contract, and property law, state court judges have more
opportunities than their federal counterparts to develop skills useful for
crafting “good” law. Common law courts also have greater opportunities to
witness the consequences of their previous lawmaking actions, thus gaining
the iterative experience of policy making over time and practice developing
policy through adjudication.164 Here we have a modern take on the classical
common lawyer’s claim that the discipline requires and produces judges
“intimately familiar with the complex ‘texture [of] human affairs,’” thus
making its practitioners more apt in practical reasoning than the average

161. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 2–3 (1988).
162. Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1250–53.
163. For a discussion of reappointment as opposed to re-election in state courts, see Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of
State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839, 860–61 (2012) (discussing how, even in
states where judges serve by appointment, “the vast majority [of high court judges] must also run in
either a contested election or, more often, an uncontested public referendum in order to keep their
jobs”).
164. Cf. Stephen M. Johnson, Competition: The Next Generation of Environmental
Regulation?, 18 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 1, 36 (2009) (considering, in the context of
administrative law, that it is better to rely on “case-by-case adjudications to develop . . . general
agency rules” than through rule making).
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person or, presumably, the mere follower of legislative fiat.165 Such
experience would be useful in making ex post adjustments to legislation that,
due to the limits of foreknowledge and human language, is necessarily
imprecise when drafted ex ante.166
To be sure, federal courts may have similar opportunities in
constitutional law and in interpreting ambiguous or open-ended statutes, but
state courts combine that experience with freestanding policy duties.167 This
argument presumes, controversially, that common lawmaking is a discipline
indistinct from practical policy making. But in a private law tradition that
includes Holmes and Posner, an assumption that merges common law with
legislative judgment is not beyond the pale.168 Just as one might respect the
Delaware Court of Chancery’s wisdom in matters of corporate governance or
defer to the Second Circuit’s in securities law, we might also find that
common law judges are pragmatically wiser than their more constrained
federal counterparts. For judges like Roger Traynor, such faith in their
ability to make reasoned and reasonable policy from the adjudicative perch
underwrites not only their approach to the common law but their aggressive
approach to statutory interpretation as well.169
We can bolster this argument by pointing to other institutional
advantages that state judges may have over their federal counterparts. Some
state judges may have further experience in the policy-making trenches due
to de novo review of administrative agencies, as well as loosened
justiciability doctrines that allow courts to resolve generalized grievances,
issue advisory opinions in some states, and adjudicate disputes that federal
courts would classify as political questions.170 Similar advantages may flow

165. Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD U.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1, 3 (2003). The classical common lawyer would not agree that his
discipline is a mere branch of legislation or applied philosophy. See id. at 3–11 (describing the
common lawyer’s conception of “artificial reason[ing]”).
166. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128–36 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the necessarily
“open texture” of legislation).
167. Federal courts, in principle, are also supposed to defer to administrative agencies on many
questions of statutory policy. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844–85 (1984). Only sixteen states give Chevron-strength deference to agency interpretations,
while fourteen states use de novo review. D. Zachary Hudson, Comment, A Case for Varying
Interpretive Deference at the State Level, 119 YALE L.J. 373, 374 (2009).
168. But see ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 204, 206–08 (1995) (defending
the autonomy of private law from public law); John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and
Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1661–62 (2012) (same).
169. See Traynor, Statutes Revolving, supra note 120, at 411 (explaining that American judges
played a far more active—and creative—role than their English counterparts in developing a
uniquely American common law). On Traynor’s belief in his ability as a policymaker, see
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN
JUDGES 243–66 (3d ed. 2007).
170. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 129, 296–300 (pointing out significant state–federal
distinctions such as “broad common-law powers of lawmaking,” the ability to “render advisory
opinions,” and facility to litigate “issues that cannot be heard in federal courts because of the
political question doctrine”); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking
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from implementing many state constitutions’ more robust guarantees of
positive political and economic rights.171 Finally, it is plausible that state
judges’ political accountability may lead to better policy making.
The argument so framed begins to resemble a familiar justification in
the federal context for Chevron deference to administrative agencies’
interpretations of statutes. One justification of Chevron points to administrative agencies’ political accountability—a point Bruhl and Leib explore in
their work on judicial elections.172 A second justification, and the one most
relevant here, is the agency’s policy-making expertise compared to that of
Article III judges.173 Professor Cass Sunstein has tellingly argued that
federal agencies are the contemporary equivalents of the common law courts
that previously forged the path of American law.174 Sunstein and Vermeule
further argue that even if federal judges should be textualists, there is good
reason for them to defer to purposive interpretations by agencies.175
Agencies’ institutional advantages help them know when “departures from
the text actually make sense” and whether such departures will destabilize
the statutory scheme.176 If, like federal agencies, state courts’ policy
competence is superior to that of the federal courts, the argument for state
court textualism is weaker than in federal jurisprudence.
III. The Potential Irrelevance of Common Law Powers
The previous Part identified how general common law powers can
strengthen the constitutional and institutional arguments for more purposive
or dynamic approaches to statutes by state courts. This Part will challenge
those constitution- and competence-based arguments and introduce more
the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1844–75 (2001) (explaining that, unlike federal
courts, state courts can issue advisory opinions, adjudicate “political questions,” and review
administrative agency decisions); Linde, supra note 147, at 1274–75 (giving examples of state court
decisions that would violate justiciability if ordered in federal courts).
171. See, e.g., TARR & PORTER, supra note 159, at 51 (observing that some state constitutions
offer “more detailed and extensive protections” than those contained in the federal Constitution);
G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169, 1176–78 (1992)
(identifying examples of substantive constitutional rights that implement specific policies).
172. Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1248–49; cf. Hudson, supra note 167, at 375–77
(explaining that state agency officials and federal judges are not as politically accountable as state
judges).
173. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(“The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly,
or explicitly, by Congress.” (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))); Sunstein &
Vermeule, supra note 148, at 904 (“[I]f a high degree of technical expertise is required, judicial
judgments might well be unreliable.” (footnote omitted)).
174. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts,
47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019 (1998); see also Hudson, supra note 167, at 377–78 (explaining that state
courts, due to their common law origins, are capable of filling in the legal and practical gaps
resulting from legislative processes).
175. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 148, at 928.
176. Id.

508

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:479

basic philosophical reasons to question the difference that the common law
prerogative makes in the statutory context.
A.

Common Law and the Constitution

Not all inferences from state constitutional rules and structure suggest
that general common law powers allow greater judicial flexibility with
enacted legislation. If common law powers are grants of authority for courts
to make law through adjudication, a skeptic could object that it is simply a
non sequitur to infer that lawmaking in one domain—adjudication where the
legislature is silent—translates into lawmaking authority in another—
applying statutes a legislature has enacted.177 As Professor Monaghan has
argued in a related context, “the fact that the courts can make law when the
political organs are silent . . . does not legitimate a similar authority when the
political organs have spoken.”178 Without some understanding about the
division of authority and the hierarchical relationship between the legislature
and the courts, we can say little about how courts should fill gaps in statutes,
extend or restrict statutes, correct absurd statutes and scrivener’s errors, or
even update or override outdated statutes.
As noted above, the constitutional case for common law differentiation
may depend on an originalist argument linking the judicial power with
equitable interpretation that can expand or restrict the scope of statutes in
light of common law reason. One problem with this argument is that even
state champions of common law differentiation concede that legislation can
override judge-made rules.179 State law may be a dialogue between courts

177. Like the affirmative case, the skeptical case in this subpart assumes that common law
adjudication is a form of positive lawmaking—a position that finds support on both sides of the
purposivist–textualist divide. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1247–49 (1996) (noting that federal courts engage in
“interstitial ‘lawmaking’” as part of the process of interpreting statutes and make positive law when
they create federal common law rules); Kaye, supra note 43, at 11 (“[S]tate courts effectively ‘make
law,’ and do so by reference to social policy, not only when deciding traditionally common-law
cases but also when faced with cases that involve difficult questions of constitutional and statutory
interpretation.”); Kramer, supra note 140, at 267 (stating that courts make law when they articulate
any rule “that is not easily found on the face of an applicable statute”). This last assumption is
controversial and may not accord with how some state courts understand their common law
jurisprudence. See also Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common
Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 898–901 (2005) (surveying state court decisions applying federal
common law wherein the state courts, in creating new rules in federal common law cases, did not
understand themselves to be making new law but rather were applying existing principles and
precedent); Green, supra note 98, at 1126 (observing that some state courts understand common law
in nonpositivist terms). Nevertheless, I hope to bracket jurisprudential questions about the nature of
the common law until later.
178. Monaghan, supra note 123, at 370. For the record, Professor Monaghan voiced no
objection to purposive interpretation. See id. (“We expect courts to interpret statutes, at least in
their marginal applications, on the premise that the legislature seeks to promote the public
good . . . .”).
179. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 21 (“[L]egislatures at times express their disagreement by
‘repealing’ or ‘vetoing’ other common-law doctrines.”).
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and legislatures, but advocates of common law purposivism in state courts do
not claim, for example, that a court can override legislative corrections of its
previous interpretations.180 If this is so, it is fair to ask why courts should
have similar freedom with reasonably clear statutes when a legislature has
not yet rebuked a court.181
Another problem with applying the originalist argument for equitable
interpretation in the state context is the varying vintage of state compacts. It
may be plausible to attribute a quasi-natural law, nonpositivistic
understanding of judging as included in the “Judiciary Power” to a document
like the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution.182 Such an inference may be
shakier for constitutions whose judiciary provisions were adopted or
amended in a twentieth century where norms of legislative supremacy are
comparatively stronger.183 Accordingly, originalist arguments for equitable
interpretation in many state courts could be vulnerable to a similar objection
of anachronism raised by textualists in the federal context.184
Even setting these objections aside, other structural features of state
constitutionalism suggest that common law powers should not play a strong
role in the interpretation of statutes. As noted, constitutional arguments for
federal textualism rely on text-based inferences in support of separation of
powers formalism.185 Many of the features textualists identify as separating
the federal judiciary from Congress also exist in state regimes: bicameralism
and presentment,186 salary protection,187 and the prohibition on bills of
180. See id. at 23 (“No one can question the legislature’s authority to correct or redirect a state
court’s interpretation of a statute.”). But see Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1755–56, 1785–
98 (describing state courts’ refusal to follow legislated rules of statutory interpretation).
181. This objection also applies to theories that ascribe to federal courts similar common law
powers. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 919,
939 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988)) (“Nothing in
Eskridge’s theory explains the disjunction between using purely positivistic approaches to
interpretation in the easy cases—where a recently-enacted statute speaks plainly and no strong
policy choices counsel another result—and nonpositivistic approaches in other situations.”);
Monaghan, supra note 123, at 375 (highlighting tension in nonoriginalist theories of constitutional
interpretation that adhere to the original meaning of “‘recent’ constitutional amendments”).
182. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3.
183. See Tarr, supra note 129, at 332 (“[T]oday’s state constitutions were established at various
points in the nation’s history, reflecting the political ideas reigning at those particular points in time,
. . . this in turn has affected the institutions that were created and the relationships established
among them.”).
184. See Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 69, at 8 (arguing that the English doctrine
of equitable interpretation of statutes as an inherent judicial power was rendered obsolete and
anachronistic by the ratification of the Constitution).
185. See generally Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1290, 1304–06 (justifying
textualism by reference to principles of separation of powers and the structure and function of
Congress as conceived of by the Constitution); Manning, Deriving Rules, supra note 104, at 1649–
50 (contending that the structure of the Constitution and specific separation of powers provisions
agitate against equitable interpretation of federal statutes by federal courts).
186. All states except Nebraska have a two-chambered legislature and all states have an
executive veto.
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attainder and ex post facto legislation.188 Scholarship in state constitutional
law also notes—if only to decry—that state courts often follow formalist
federal jurisprudence on separation of powers.189
If anything, the separation norms in many state constitutional regimes
are stronger than in the federal context. One specific indicator of judicial
caution is the “antifederalist” approach to separation of powers that a leading
scholar of state constitutional law has identified in state jurisprudence.190
That line of thought adopts the Whig tradition of strict separation of powers
and legislative omnipotence, a combination hostile to a vigorous judicial role
in statutory interpretation. Unlike the federal Constitution, many state
compacts also have explicit and strict separation of powers provisions.191
Some question the effect of these textual commitments in state
jurisprudence,192 but such provisions bridge a potential pitfall for federal
separation of powers formalists.193 This feature of state constitutional theory
has been prominent in the administrative law context, where state courts are
more willing than their federal counterparts to enforce a nondelegation
doctrine.194 Similarly, a notable departure in state courts from strict

187. See Amended State Constitutional Provisions Regarding Reductions to Judicial Salaries
(January 2009), NCSC, http://www.ncsconline.org/d_kis/salary_survey/provisions.asp (reporting
that twenty-nine states clearly prohibit reductions in judicial salaries and that another five states
permit reductions only if applicable to all public officers).
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
189. See Schapiro, supra note 129, at 88–92 (surveying and criticizing state supreme court
decisions relying on federal separation of powers doctrine in interpreting state constitutions).
190. See Rossi, supra note 129, at 1172 (“Like Antifederalist political science, many states,
more than federal courts, view separation of powers as requiring complete separation of functions
and most states see the legislature as the supreme lawmaker.”).
191. WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 236–37; Tarr, supra note 129, at 337–38. Compare THE
FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 332 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“[P]owers properly
belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either
of the other departments.” (emphasis added)), with IND. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (“The powers of the
Government are divided into three separate departments; the Legislative, the Executive including
the Administrative, and the Judicial: and no person, charged with official duties under one of these
departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly
provided.” (emphasis added)).
192. Rossi, supra note 129, at 1220 (questioning the explanatory power of textual
interpretations of state separation of powers provisions in light of the wide divergence in separation
of powers approaches amongst states with similar separation of powers clauses). But see Askew v.
Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978) (deriving a strong nondelegation doctrine
from the Florida Constitution’s Separation of Powers Clause); Tarr, supra note 129, at 338 (“[Such
text] encourages an interpreter to employ . . . the formalist approach to the separation of
powers . . . .”).
193. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1939, 1944 (2011) (“The Constitution contains no Separation of Powers Clause.”).
194. See Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of Powers and
State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1343, 1359 (2005) (arguing that state nondelegation doctrine is “much more rigid” than in
the federal context).
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separation—tolerance of a legislative veto—is consistent with a
constitutional commitment to legislative branch policy making.195
Many state constitutions also contain more compromise-forcing
“vetogates” than the U.S. Constitution. Beyond preexisting bicameralism
and presentment requirements,196 many state constitutions have line item
vetoes, detailed rules governing legislative procedure, single-subject and
balanced-budget requirements, and shortened legislative sessions.197 To be
sure, many of these requirements arose out of a second wave of amendments
in response to the excesses of legislatures, which were awarded
disproportionate power under original constitutional arrangements.198 While
these amendments may mute the parliamentary character of state
constitutions, they do not encourage functionalist blending of legislative
functions across branches. If, as federal textualists claim, constitutional
vetogates are compromise-forcing mechanisms that judges should respect
while interpreting statutes,199 the more finely calibrated procedures and limits
in state constitutions further militate against judicial smoothing of sharp
statutory corners.
B.

Common Law and Institutional Competence

The institutionalist arguments against common law differentiation
minimize the potential benefits that the practice of such powers brings to
courts, while emphasizing the limits to judicial competence—limits that
general common law powers do not diminish and might even exacerbate.
If the aim of statutory interpretation is discerning historical legislative
intent, a court’s common law powers are of modest import.200 As noted
above, if common law concepts are more common in state statutes, a state
court may be marginally better at identifying background norms at odds with
semantic textual meaning. On the other hand, a common law court may
overestimate the extent to which common law concepts pervade statutes,
given the salience that those concepts have for a court steeped in that
tradition. Accordingly, state courts could be more likely to erroneously
impute common law meaning. In any event, intent in statutes that abrogate
195. See Rossi, supra note 129, at 1217 (identifying “underenforcement of . . . restrictions on
the legislative veto” in state constitutional law).
196. All states have a gubernatorial veto of some kind, and every state except Nebraska has two
legislative chambers that must approve legislation.
197. See WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 257–67 (exploring procedural restrictions state
constitutions impose on the legislative process); Tarr, supra note 129, at 335 (surveying state
constitutional restrictions on process and substance designed to check legislative abuses).
198. Id. at 334–35.
199. See Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1314–15 (arguing that because of
procedural mechanisms that promote compromise in the legislative process, courts should prefer
clear text over legislative history in interpreting a statute in order to remain true to the political
compromises presumably underlying the final text of the legislation).
200. See supra subsection II(C)(2)(a) (describing the limited improvements to competence in
statutory interpretation provided by common law powers).
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the common law or legislate in the absence of common law would not be
intrinsically clearer to a common law court.
As with historical intent, one can argue that common law powers have
little to do with gauging present legislative intent or more general political
preferences. Even if one were to concede the (controversial) premise that
common law courts more frequently must gauge social norms in
adjudication,201 it is fair to wonder whether practice makes more perfect in
this context. Given that state judges, like their federal counterparts, are often
part of the political and legal elite,202 there are grounds for skepticism here,
or at least there is reason to be more confident about judges’ ability to
estimate the current legislature’s preferences, rather than those of the
populace. Nor is it clear that any marginal advantage in gauging historical or
present legislative intent or political preferences would justify a wholesale
change in interpretive method. If the institutional textualist is convinced that
a rule-like, plain meaning approach to interpretation will lead to significantly
fewer errors over the long run in gauging intent,203 she might ask for more
than the concededly indirect gains that the advocate of common law
difference offers her.
Finally, there are serious objections to the Chevron-inspired argument
that, even if federal courts should be textualist, common law courts’ superior
policy-making expertise justifies their use of purposive or dynamic
approaches.204 State courts share many of the institutional infirmities that
lead textualists to disfavor courts’ interpretive policy making. Like federal
courts, state courts lack expert staff and fact-finding abilities.205 State courts
must also take concrete cases as they come, rather than investigating and
initiating general proceedings.206 This case-based nature of adjudicative
lawmaking limits a court’s ability to control a policy agenda and to see the
effects of policy over time. Adjudication’s intense focus on the particular
facts at hand rather than the broader picture may also lead to blinkered policy

201. See supra subsection II(C)(2)(b) (discussing the contention that state court judges must
weigh social custom and communal understanding in exercising their traditional common law
powers).
202. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 159, at 55 (noting that “often . . . [state] justices are the
products of politically active families,” “20 percent have served in the state legislature,” “almost
20 percent have served in the state attorney general’s office,” and “over 70 percent have held at
least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection”).
203. See supra section II(C)(1).
204. See supra subsection II(C)(2)(c).
205. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions,
104 NW. U. L. REV. 799, 836–37 (2010) (discussing agencies’ comparative competence in fact
gathering and policy making).
206. See WALTER F. MURPHY & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAW 65–66
(1972) (stating that courts are “usually passive instruments of government” lacking a “self-starter”
and that “[n]ormally, someone outside of the judicial system has to bring a suit or invoke a set of
special circumstances to transform judicial power from a potential to a kinetic state”).
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making.207 As Lon Fuller also long ago noted, multidimensional policy
problems—ones that are most likely to stretch courts beyond their familiar
common law competence—may not be amenable to resolution through
adjudication, including through the common law method.208
If we are looking to federal administrative law for guidance on this
question, it pays to also consider how that body of learning is suspicious of
adjudicative policy making by agencies—bodies with policy-making
competences exceeding those of common law courts. There is doubt about
whether Chevron deference applies to agencies that, like courts, have power
to adjudicate but not promulgate legislative rules.209 The deference that
agency adjudications receive does not displace the longstanding criticism that
scholars levy at agencies that eschew rule making in favor of adjudicative
policy making.210 Those concerns, if true and if extended by analogy to state
courts, militate against purposivist or dynamic interpretation. A state legal
system, just like a federal agency, has rule making and adjudicative outlets
for policy making—the legislature and the courts, respectively. Purposive or
dynamic interpretation by courts would be analogous to administrative policy
making by adjudication: the adjudicative body—the courts—would develop
and change general rules on a case-by-case basis, thus shifting the center of
policy making gravity from legislation to adjudication. Textualism, by
comparison, seeks to give primacy to a centralized lawmaker with broader
perspective and fact-finding abilities.211 If, as some have argued, a
requirement that agencies use rule making in some instances is not judicially
manageable,212 it may also be challenging for a state court to decide whether
de facto rule making (textualist) or adjudication (purposivist) is proper.

207. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006)
(arguing that, if he or she only focuses on the facts of the case at hand, a judge may produce a
suboptimal rule for later cases if the case at hand is not representative “of the full array of events
that the ensuing rule or principle will encompass”).
208. See LON L. FULLER, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL
ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 86, 111–21 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981)
(explaining why “polycentric” problems are frequently unsuited to solution by adjudication).
209. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 890
(2001) (noting the circuit split on the issue and arguing that the power to issue binding, selfexecuting adjudications is sufficient). Compare Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114
(2002) (reserving judgment on question), with id. at 122 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“We have, of
course, previously held that because the EEOC was not given rulemaking authority to interpret the
substantive provisions of Title VII, its substantive regulations do not receive Chevron
deference . . . .”).
210. For an encomium to the superiority of rule making, see RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.8 (5th ed. 2010).
211. From this perspective, barriers to action facing state legislatures may still leave state court
updating a second-best option. Cf. Paul R. Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossification—A Modest Proposal,
47 ADMIN. L. REV. 453, 453 (1995) (bemoaning procedural obstacles to administrative rule
making).
212. John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 894–95 (2004).
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The Common Law and Concepts of Legal Interpretation

A philosophically inclined person might object that talking straight
away about constitutional authority and competence skips a critical first step,
namely having a theory about what it means to “interpret” a legal text at all.
If, for example, the textualist separation of semantic meaning from purpose is
conceptually impossible or if equitable correction of texts is not
“interpretation,” the constitution- and competence-based arguments above
may confuse more basic issues about law and interpretation. A critic with
such concerns would instead put two theoretical horses before the
constitutional or competence cart. First, we need a theory about reading and
understanding legal texts. Let’s call these commitments the interpreter’s
hermeneutical framework. Second, because we are interpreting legal texts,
beliefs about the nature of law in general—or statutes and common law in
particular—may be similarly basic. Let’s call these beliefs the interpreter’s
jurisprudential framework.
In recent years, legal philosophers have
increasingly explored links between hermeneutical and jurisprudential
understandings, an inquiry that may raise corresponding inferences about
how an interpreter handles statutes.213
Considering these foundational questions offers two very different but
plausible arguments that common law powers are irrelevant to interpretive
choice. Before presenting those arguments, however, it helps first to say
more about these more basic frameworks.
1. First Principles.
a. Hermeneutical Framework.—This may all sound quite abstract,
and the literature and arguments on this score are vast and complex. But we
can get the feel for this aspect of interpretive choice by going back to the
classic debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller about an ordinance
prohibiting “vehicles in the park.”214 An interpreter must decide whether the
ordinance applies to things like roller skates, ambulances, or strollers.215
Hart would approach this problem by distinguishing between the “core” and
“penumbra” of a rule.216 There will be situations—think of a Hummer

213. For a collection of works along these lines, see LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995). In his Preface, Marmor notes that in arguments
about interpretation “a close but controversial link emerges . . . between the concept of
interpretation and the concept of law.” Id. at vii; see also Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter,
Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 203.
214. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593
(1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630 (1958).
215. Hart, supra note 214, at 607.
216. Id.
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zooming across the grass, blasting hair metal from tricked-out speakers217—
that are easy cases. There, the law governs without much work for the judge
besides recognizing the fit between the situation and the ordinance. But there
will also be peripheral cases—think of a tricycle—where it is unclear
whether the rule prohibiting “vehicles” applies. There, the judge must
exercise discretion. The judge makes new law, drawing sharp lines in a
region that the legislature left fuzzy. As we move from the core of a rule to
the periphery, we move from the realm of legal interpretation to lawmaking
discretion.218
Lon Fuller challenged the core and penumbra dichotomy.219 In the
apparently peripheral case of a tricycle, the argument goes, the interpreter
does not exercise legislative discretion to include or exclude trikes within the
category of “vehicles,” but rather seeks to identify, articulate, and apply the
purpose of the statute, which either includes trikes or does not.220 Nor in the
ostensibly “core” case of a jeep does an interpreter simply recognize and
categorize a jeep as a qualifying “vehicle.” A functioning yet immobile jeep
placed in the park as a war memorial is as vehicular as it gets, but is not
obviously classified as core or penumbral.221 Legal rules, Fuller argues, are
only comprehensible in light of their background purposes, which thus
collapses the distinction between linguistic rule following at the core and
discretionary legislation at the periphery.222
A version of this hoary squabble continues today. Contemporary
textualism depends on a similar distinction between the core and periphery.
Manning’s central tenet of textualism—privileging semantic meaning over
statutory policy in cases of conflict—presumes the Hartian claim that there
are cases in which a core semantic meaning covers and thus decides a case.223
217. See, e.g., MӦTLEY CRÜE, Kickstart My Heart, on DR. FEELGOOD (Elektra 1989)
(exemplifying the genre).
218. See HART, supra note 166, 128–32 (arguing that courts must exercise discretion akin to
that of rule-making bodies in difficult cases where there is no “one uniquely correct answer to be
found, as distinct from an answer which is a reasonable compromise between many conflicting
interests”); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 194–97
(1979) (explaining that legislators often pass “deliberately underdetermined rules” because they
prefer to let the courts exercise discretion in filling in the gaps within the limits of a core general
framework and giving rules referring to reasonableness, fairness, and just cause as examples).
219. See Fuller, supra note 214, at 661–69 (rejecting Hart’s assertion that the only way to
effectuate “the ideal of fidelity to law” is to adopt his theory of interpretation, which Fuller
criticizes for its focus on the meaning of individual words rather than statutory purpose and
structure).
220. See id. at 665–66 (stating that, in all situations, a judge should seek to decide whether a
particular outcome is consistent with the purpose of the statute).
221. Id. at 663.
222. Id.
223. The cognate form of originalist textualism in constitutional interpretation relies on a
similar distinction. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 95–96 (2010) (distinguishing “interpretation” of the original and public
semantic meaning of constitutional text from “construction” of the text when its meaning is
underdetermined).
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By contrast, collapsing the meaning–purpose dichotomy will strengthen
arguments that dynamic or strongly purposive approaches are compatible
with legislative supremacy—an interpreter has a constructive role not merely
at the putative periphery, but in all cases. Related claims about the
insufficiency of textual meaning or original intent also have more force if a
sharp distinction between text and context is untenable.224 On that ground,
textualism is impossible.
b. Jurisprudential Framework.—Hermeneutic beliefs—commitments about what it means to “interpret” a legal text—may also form
“natural alliances” with understandings about the nature of law.225 For
example, some intentionalists link their approach to statutory interpretation
with forms of legal positivism. Professor Alexander argues that because
law’s task is to make moral decisions more determinate, law does not do its
job when it points us to general moral standards. To succeed, law must offer
rules announced in texts that communicate the authority’s determinations and
override the audience’s moral judgment. The aim of legal interpretation,
then, is to understand what the authority intended to communicate. Anything
more complex, Alexander argues, is an act of re-authorship or moral
judgment, not legal interpretation.226 One could craft a similar positivist
argument for textualism by shifting the locus of authority from the speaker’s
meaning (intentionalism) to the reasonable reader’s meaning (textualism). If
the function and nature of law is to provide authoritative guidance,
textualism’s adherence to a text’s objective, semantic meaning avoids both
the uncertainty (or incoherence) of searching for subjective intent and the
indeterminacy and discretion of seeking a coherent, overarching purpose.227

224. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
609, 618 (1990) (“[I]nterpreter and text are indissolubly linked as a matter of being; the text is part
of the context that has formed the interpreter, and the interpreter is the agent of the text’s continued
viability.”); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 139, at 342–43 (noting the importance of both original
and current context in textual interpretation).
225. Heidi M. Hurd, Interpreting Authorities, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 213, at 405, 406. Hurd’s use of “alliances” is apt. The claim that a theory
of law has necessary consequences for legal decision making is controversial. See generally Brian
Bix, Robert Alexy, Radbruch’s Formula and the Nature of Legal Theory, 37 RECHTSTHEORIE 139
(2006).
226. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority
of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 213, at
357, 359–63 (explaining that “texts mean what their authors intend them to mean” and, therefore,
when interpreting a text, a judge changes a text when he diverts from the author’s intentions); see
also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493, 518 (2005) (condemning natural law theories of judicial decision making
on the basis that they lead to the usurpation of legislative supremacy).
227. See Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 19, at 2457–58 (articulating a reasonable
reader’s approach to meaning); cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1185 (1989) (“But when [a court] does not have a solid textual anchor or an established
social norm from which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement appears uncomfortably like
legislation.”).
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Critics of original intent and textualist interpretation of statutes also
point to links between these theories of meaning and legal positivism.228
Connections between nonpositivist theories of law and theories of statutory
interpretation are similarly evident. Ronald Dworkin provides a classic
example; the initial chapter of Law’s Empire is entitled “What is Law?” and
probes that question through examples of statutory interpretation.229 His
general jurisprudence understands “law” not as merely posited rules that
apply or not, but as a practice of “interpretive judgments” in which we
construct from legal materials and moral principles a theory of the law that
makes it the “best it can be.”230
From this general statement about the nature of law follows Dworkin’s
claim “that statutes must be read in whatever way follows from the best
interpretation of the legislative process as a whole.”231 Thus, he highlights
the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Riggs v. Palmer232 to deny an
inheritance to a testator’s murderer, even though murder fell into none of the
exceptions to inheritance in New York’s statute governing wills.233 By
contrast, he criticizes as formalistic the Supreme Court’s decision to halt the
construction of a nearly completed, $100 million dam pursuant to a statutory
prohibition on projects jeopardizing the “continued existence” of an
endangered “three-inch fish of no particular beauty or biological interest or
general ecological importance.”234 Against arguments that semantically clear
text, when it exists, should trump background principles and policies,
Dworkin rejects any sharp distinction between clear and unclear cases.235
Echoing Fuller’s discussion of vehicles in the park, Dworkin argues that easy
statutory cases only appear to be solved by text alone because the text and
moral principles in those situations are harmonious.236 Dworkin’s theory

228. See, e.g., SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 252–54 (2011) (describing critics of textualism’s
linkage of the theory to legal positivism); Hurd, supra note 225, at 413–18 (arguing that the theory
of intentionalist interpretation is compelling only when the citizenry believes that the legislature
functions as a practical authority, i.e., that “laws function as commands rather than requests”). As
Shapiro and Hurd note, textualism or intentionalism may not inextricably flow from positivism.
229. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 15–23 (1986); see also Hurd, supra note 225, at 425
(locating “the theoretical authority of law” primarily in legislative text, while judging all
“interpretive techniques” by “their ability to conform our conduct to the demands of morality”);
Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 286–88 (1985)
(propounding a natural law theory of adjudication as opposed to one rooted in legal positivism);
Goldsworthy, supra note 226, at 510–18 (exploring the links between these theorists’ jurisprudential
and interpretive theories).
230. DWORKIN, supra note 229, at 53, 225.
231. Id. at 337.
232. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
233. Id. at 190–91.
234. DWORKIN, supra note 229, at 20–21 (discussing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978)).
235. Id. at 350–54.
236. See, e.g., id. at 351 (arguing that the will statute in Riggs is unclear only “because we
ourselves have some reason to think that murderers should not inherit”).
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about how to read legal texts and how to conceive of law are one and the
same.
With this rough-and-ready introduction to hermeneutical and
jurisprudential approaches to statutory interpretation in hand, we can now
turn to two plausible arguments that the presence or absence of general
common law powers is irrelevant to a court’s approach to statutory
interpretation.
2. The Argument from Semantic Belief and Common Law Skepticism.—
This offered approach first assumes that an interpreter can disentangle the
text’s semantic meaning from policy context or background moral principles.
Like Hart, a person adopting this framework believes legal language can
have a “core,” in which a statute obviously covers the facts at hand. These
semantically “easy” cases—the Hummer blasting music as a “vehicle in the
park”—contrast with “hard” cases where application of the core meaning
creates uncertain results—the tricycle in the park. Like Manning and
Alexander, such a theorist believes that it is possible for semantic meaning to
be clear and knowable even if it runs at cross-purposes with the statute’s
likely purpose. Barring ice cream trucks or ambulances from a park might
seem strange, but the “no vehicles” rule covers both.
This framework would also assume that all law, including common law
precedent, is modeled on posited, authoritative legislation. I call this
common law “skepticism” because it doubts the traditional common lawyer’s
claim that the law is comprised of unfolding reason, preexisting custom, or
principles immanent in the case law. Instead, as Alexander argues, common
law adjudication consists of creating, following, or amending rules that
happen to be handed down by judges rather than legislators.237 This is so
even if judges exercise restraint through stare decisis or decisional
minimalism.238 This legislative understanding of common law features into
discussions of federal common law by its champions and critics alike.239

237. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 25–26
(2008) (courts either “reason deductively from rules posited by others; or they posit law, relying on
moral and empirical judgment, as any lawmaker must”); Pojanowski, supra note 205, at 814–20
(describing legislative understanding of common law); see also A.W.B. Simpson, The Common
Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: SECOND SERIES 77, 89 (1973)
(describing and criticizing this as the “school-rules” model of common law).
238. See RAZ, supra note 218, at 200–01 (noting that even the traditionally conservative
lawmaking role of the courts involves partial reform measures that “introduce[] pragmatic conflict
into the law”).
239. See D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 468 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(explaining that federal common law “to put it bluntly,” allows the Court to “make our own law
from materials found in common-law sources”); Clark, supra note 177, at 1247–49 (raising
concerns about federal judicial lawmaking intruding on the powers of the legislature and of the
states); Kramer, supra note 140, at 267 (“[T]he common law includes any rule articulated by a court
that is not easily found on the face of an applicable statute.”).
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Many state court judges, including those who reject semantic limits in
statutory interpretation, also speak of the common law in such a fashion.240
An interpreter with these twin assumptions would not view many hard
legal questions as concerning the “interpretation” of statutes or precedent at
all. The difference between a rule’s solid core of meaning and the open
texture of its periphery renders the term law-“making” more apt than law“finding” in unclear precedential and statutory cases alike. In cases of first
impression or where a statute’s semantic meaning or authoritative intent run
out, the law offers no single answer and the judge has authority to resolve the
matter through discretion.241 Similarly, when a judge reverses a precedent or
refuses to apply the no vehicles rule to the ambulance, these are exercises of
legislative power, not interpretation. In short, this arrangement collapses
common law into the legislative idiom, with the difference between common
and statute law turning on a rule’s mode of origin—judge versus
legislature—not substance.242
From this perspective, a state court’s possession of general common
lawmaking powers does not alone entail divergence from federal court
approaches to statutes. Both state and federal courts can have delegated
authority to “make law” within statutory gaps, while the state courts have the
additional prerogative to “legislate” in the absence of statutory coverage.
The delegated lawmaking powers that state and federal courts share with
respect to statutes have little to do with actual “interpretation,” as both courts
make law in the gaps rather than find legal meaning.243 So understood, a
state court’s additional, general lawmaking powers lead to divergence from
federal practice only if that power further authorizes state courts to override a
statute’s clear semantic commands in a way that federal courts cannot. A
court’s exercise of this expanded prerogative involves a de facto amendment
of the statute, not its interpretation. Whether a court has that power is a
question of constitutional rules regarding lawmaking hierarchy, not an
entailment of a freestanding power to make law where the legislature has not.
If state and federal courts both accept similar forms of legislative supremacy,
240. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 10 (“In spite of the anxiety surrounding the legitimacy of
judicial lawmaking, I believe that the inherent, yet principled flexibility of the common law remains
the defining feature of the state court judicial process today.”); Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a
Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 739, 751 (1970) [hereinafter Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle]
(characterizing judging as “the recurring choice of one policy over another” in the formulation of
new rules).
241. Cf. HART, supra note 166, at 131–32 (contending that precedent, despite its binding force,
often leaves the law open for judicial legislation).
242. See Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 6) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021489## (“Modern lawyers . . . . tend to assume that the unwritten law of
each state is fundamentally like the written law of each state, except that it is made by a different
branch of the state government . . . .”).
243. See Alexander, supra note 226, at 359–63 (asserting that texts only carry the meaning that
was intended by their authors and that therefore any changes to that meaning are not actually
interpretations of the text at all).
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however, it is not clear that a state court’s broader yet nevertheless defeasible
lawmaking powers make any difference in the interpretation of statutes.
3. The Argument from Semantic Skepticism and Common Law Belief.—
A competing approach reverses these premises about interpretation and law,
but only to reach the same conclusion that a state court’s common law
powers do not create divergence from interpretation in the federal context.
First, the theorist will reject the notion that the interpreter’s perception
of clear semantic meaning or intent is separable from the statute or the legal
system’s background purposes. The theorist sides with Fuller in his debate
with Hart about language and interpretation.244 The answers for both “easy”
and “hard” questions about “vehicles in the park” turn on an understanding
of nonsemantic norms existing above or behind the words on the page.
Answering a “hard” case is not an act of legislative discretion, but a
disciplined practice with an inevitable appeal to nonsemantic matters like
history, purpose, and moral principle.245 An “easy” case, by contrast, only
appears to be so because of a close fit between the semantic meaning and the
background norms.246
Second, this approach would also reject the
understanding of common law as a system of posited rules. I call this
common law “belief” because it accepts in some form the traditional
common lawyers’ argument that the rules and principles announced in
judicial decisions and legal treatises are merely evidence of the common law
on a question, which in fact exists independent of those texts.247 In this
respect, Dworkin’s claim that law is not just a system of rules and his
competing interpretive theory of law as integrity cast him as a descendant of
the common law tradition.248
This framework regards the language of both statutes and precedent as
signs pointing the interpreter to the reasoned purpose that is in fact the law.
Such regard for legislation resembles the classical common lawyers’
treatment of statutes as well as Ronald Dworkin’s purposive approach to

244. Fuller, supra note 214, at 663–66. One can also see this premise in the statutory
pragmatist’s claim that it is impossible for interpreters to limit themselves to purely semantic
sources when constructing the meaning of statutes. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 139, at
353–54 (describing the “funnel of abstraction,” wherein the interpreter looks at a broad range of
evidence which may support or contradict any particular meaning or understanding).
245. See DWORKIN, supra note 229, at 352 (arguing that when general principles of society
conflict with the language of a statute, that statute may be unclear).
246. See id. at 353 (asserting that easy questions of law arise when general societal principles
align with the statutory language).
247. See Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 596 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002)
(“Classical common law jurisprudence resolutely resisted the theoretical pressure to identify law
with canonically formulated, discrete rules of law.”).
248. See Mark D. Walters, Legal Humanism and Law-As-Integrity, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 352,
353, 363–64 (2008) (drawing parallels between Dworkin’s thought and common law “humanists”
like John Dodderidge and Francis Bacon); see also Goldsworthy, supra note 125, at 231–32
(echoing Walters’s parallels with regards to Sir Edward Coke).
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statutory interpretation.249 This convergence also sounds in the calls of
Roscoe Pound, James Landis, and Justice Stone for courts to use statutes as
sources of fresh principles for the development of common law.250 To be
sure, classical common lawyers embraced supra-textual interpretation to
integrate statutes into the superior common law, whereas twentieth-century
jurists hoped progressive statutory principles would supplant the retrograde
obscurities of their Blackstonian inheritance.251 In both modes, however,
judges have oracular power, whether by expounding the reason of judgemade law or principles immanent in legislation.
This second approach is the mirror image of the framework discussed
above. It denies both the separation of semantic meaning from background
purpose and the hard positivist understanding of common law and statute.
Like its converse, it too collapses the distinction between common law and
statute, though here it assimilates both into a model of law and legal
reasoning reminiscent of nonpositivist common law theory. Its concept of
“interpretation” is as capacious as its counterpart is narrow, so it
emphatically maintains that broadening, narrowing, or extending statutes in
common law fashion is in fact a matter of interpretation. Judge Kaye
gestures at this approach, notwithstanding her concession to legislative
supremacy. She claims the common law is derived “from human wisdom
collected . . . over countless generations to form a stable body of rules”252 and
denies any “sharp break” in the statutory and precedential reasoning, for
“there remains at the core the same common-law process of discerning and
applying the purpose of the law.”253 Other arguments in favor of treating
statutes like precedents have gestured at a similar interchangeability between
the two modes of law, with a similarly central role for the jurist.254

249. See Heydon’s Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (K.B.) 638, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b (announcing
that statutes shall be interpreted in light of the mischief they sought to remedy); DWORKIN, supra
note 229, at 337 (contending that statutes must be read in a way that best interprets the legislative
purpose as a whole).
250. See James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 213, 215 (1934) (discussing judges’ use of the doctrine of equity to conform statutes to
generally recognized aims of the law); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L.
REV. 605, 614 (1908) (acknowledging that common law has failed to properly address certain
modern issues and should draw on legislation for fresh principles of growth); Harlan F. Stone, The
Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12–14 (1936) (describing the treatment of
statutes as sources of law which judicial decisions can extend).
251. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century
Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731, 1734–35 (1993).
252. Kaye, supra note 43, at 5.
253. Id. at 25.
254. See generally Traynor, Statutes Revolving, supra note 120, at 405, 425 (comparing the
similarities between judicial interpretation of statutes and judicial interpretation of common law);
Robert F. Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-Law Cases, 50
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 544, 556 (1982) (arguing that, because the underlying statutory policy likely
has significance beyond its text, courts should use statutes as persuasive authority in cases where the
statute does not apply directly).
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Yet under this approach, the case for state–federal divergence is perhaps
even weaker than under assumptions of semantic belief and common law
skepticism. If statutory interpretation proceeds in the fashion of precedential
reasoning, and if common law reasoning in the absence of statutes is not a
form of judicial legislation, then a state court’s apparently distinguishing
feature of common law powers turns out to be redundant to the claim of
interpretive freedom. Strongly purposive or dynamic reading of statutes
follows irrespective of whether a court had jurisdiction over common law
causes of action. An absence of general common law authority matters only
if one conceives of common law powers as authority for judicial
legislation—a premise this framework rejects. In this light, Dworkin’s
interchangeable treatment of statutory interpretation in the New York Court
of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court is a logical outgrowth of his vision
of law and interpretation, not an oversight.255 Both state and federal courts,
from this perspective, should reject textualism for the same reasons.
IV. A Tentative Case for Divergence
Parts II and III provide and apply frameworks for considering the
difference common law powers may make for state interpretive method
compared to that of the federal courts. A satisfactory resolution of the
preliminary arguments for and against divergence will require more work
than has been expended thus far. Nevertheless, this Part offers a tentative
proposal that attempts to account for and reconcile the competing
constitutional, institutional, and conceptual claims concerning the effect of
state courts’ common law powers on statutory interpretation. This proposal
suggests that while constitutional concerns may preclude state courts from
narrowing the semantic meaning of a statute to fit its background purpose,
these courts retain discretion to extend a statute beyond its linguistic scope in
pursuit of the statute’s purpose or broader coherence in the legal fabric. This
approach mirrors neither federal textualism nor its purposive or dynamic
rivals, but it does account for aspects of state court interpretation that existing
commentary cannot explain.
A.

The Proposed Hybrid Model and Its Assumptions

Recalling the federal context will help to understand this argument for
state court divergence in interpretation. As Professor Manning argues, the
dividing line between federal textualism and purposivism is the choice
between a statute’s semantic meaning and its background purpose when the
two conflict.256 Semantic meaning and purpose can conflict in two ways. A

255. See DWORKIN, supra note 229, at 15–23 (comparing a New York Court of Appeals’
decision that relied heavily on the legislative purpose of a wills statute with a U.S. Supreme Court
decision based on a literalist reading of the statute in question).
256. Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 76.
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statute’s semantic meaning may be overinclusive, covering matters not
within the statute’s apparent purpose. Or the semantic scope may be
underinclusive, such that it does not extend to matters that, in light of
statutory purpose and policy, ideally should be covered.
The federal textualist would stick to semantic meaning in cases of
overinclusion and underinclusion. The federal purposivist, by contrast,
would privilege purpose in both circumstances. My argument is that a
court’s general common law powers open a third path. Under this approach,
courts with these powers should refuse to narrow the semantic scope of a
statute—in short, be “textualist” on semantic overbreadth—but retain
discretion to broaden a statute’s coverage beyond its semantic borders—to be
“purposive” or arguably even “dynamic” on semantic underbreadth. Here,
courts regard the legal landscape as a tract of common law that the legislature
has a plenary right to displace or develop through statutes—or to create new
“tracts” of law where no common law had before existed. The legislature
can preempt judicial development of the law but, absent affirmative indicia
to the contrary, legislative inaction permits activity by courts, including
extension of rules and principles originating in legislation. In this respect,
the relationship between the state courts and the state legislature would
resemble that between federal courts and Congress in the context of enclaves
of federal common law or the federal courts’ inherent, defeasible powers to
make procedural rules, though the conceded nature of state courts’ common
law powers would lessen concerns about the constitutional source of such
judicial authority.257
For similar reasons, a state court’s common law powers may also
suggest a different approach to vague or ambiguous statutes. If internal
“gaps” in a statute do not displace the common law backdrop, a court
interpreting a vague statute might not be required to estimate legislative
intent or purpose in filling out the details. Comity, statutory coherence, and
judicial humility may recommend faithful agency, but in the common law
zone other considerations legitimately compete with those reasons. With this
sketch in mind, a return to the criteria of interpretive choice will help in
understanding and evaluating this tentative proposal.
1. Constitutional Inferences.—In line with federal textualism, this
approach prohibits a state court from narrowing the ordinary meaning of a
statute to avoid an awkward application or to preserve common law
prerogative. This limit on purposive or equitable interpretation follows from
constitutional norms of legislative supremacy and separation of powers
discussed above. Common law is defeasible law that must yield when

257. For an example of a textualist identifying and providing an originalist justification for
federal courts’ inherent powers to craft procedural common law, see generally Amy Coney Barrett,
Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008).
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statutory law covers a particular point of decision.258 A similar conclusion
follows from constitutional norms respecting legislative compromise. In
systems with bicameralism and presentment and other vetogates, the means a
legislature chooses to accomplish an end are as important as the goal itself.
Judicial fine-tuning would upset those compromises. This result, it seems,
can pertain whether we think of “common law” as positivist judicial
legislation or in the nonpositivist terms of custom or reason. Statutes are
jurisprudentially “solid” such that common law reasoning cannot justifiably
chip away at their scope.
It is less clear, by contrast, that legislative supremacy and compromise
prohibit judicial extension or supplementation of statutes by common law
courts. The question is what default rule common law courts should use in
cases of legislative silence. Does a statute’s treatment of matter x in a
situation preclude a court from treating analogous matter y the same way in
the same situation?259 For federal textualists, the answer is yes, in part to
protect legislative compromise as discussed above.260 But even those
textualists will allow common law-like development when the legislature
delegates such authority to courts.261 This affirmative requirement of
legislative delegation—and the corresponding negative inference from
silence on judicial lawmaking—fall away when the legal backdrop assumes
an interpreter with general, defeasible power to develop law where the
legislature has not. In this context, silence alone is insufficient to raise the
federal textualist’s negative inference, though statutory text or other
constitutional norms may do so expressly or through strong implication.262
This approach respects and reflects many differences between state and
federal constitutions in terms of structure and lawmaking authority. State
constitutions give courts more substantive lawmaking powers than their
federal counterparts while embracing structural norms of separation of
powers and legislative supremacy that are stricter than those contemplated by
Madison.263 These features of state separation of powers push in opposite

258. Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 888.
259. See Traynor, Statutes Revolving, supra note 120, at 405 (seeming to answer “yes” by
arguing that judges can reason by analogy to extend the application of a statute to a circumstance
not covered by its plain meaning).
260. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 109 (suggesting that unless the statute clearly gives
courts the power to develop interstitial common law, judges should restrict the statute to situations
clearly anticipated by its framers as expressed in the legislative process).
261. Id. at 544–45.
262. For example, statutory language indicating a legislative remedy was exclusive would
prohibit extension, and due process notice norms would likely prohibit the purposive extension of
criminal statutes.
263. Cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 313 (observing that because “state constitutions are
different in a number of ways from the more-familiar federal Constitution . . . judicial interpretation
of state constitutions can be quite different”); see also G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and
State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 841, 857–58 (1991) (exploring how state
constitutional interpretation may differ).
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directions, but the hybrid approach respects both the judicial prerogative and
legislative supremacy.
Overall, this approach resembles the arrangement arising in England
with the ascent of Parliament, the separation of the courts from the Crown,
and the consequent waning of equitable interpretation. There, too, common
law courts, operating in the shadow of a supreme parliament, privileged text
in statutory interpretation while assuming that common law governed on all
matters of legislation left uncovered.264 This approach continued into the
twentieth century, with courts respecting legislation overturning particular
decisions, while still treating the underlying principles as valid in other
doctrinal pockets not addressed by the statute.265 A similar approach was
arguably held in Australia prior to the legislative codification of purposive
interpretation.266 Under their pre-statutory “common law” of interpretation,
Australian courts would rely on purpose only when the text was ambiguous
or inconsistent.267 These commonwealth courts differed from my tentative
proposal, however, in their hesitance to apply statutory rules beyond their
scope and the courts’ proclivity for overly narrow reading of statutes.268
These practices, however, seem as much a product of distaste for statutes as
respect for the legislature. Common law courts could give statutes
“reasonable” rather than “strict” constructions269 while also realizing that a
legislature’s failure to address one matter by statute does not always preclude
a court from addressing it on its own. The familial resemblance between the
proposed approach and English or Australian practice may not be a
constitutional coincidence. Like state courts, the highest courts of appeal in
commonwealth nations like the United Kingdom and Australia traditionally
had to reconcile their undisputedly general common law powers with a
system of legislative supremacy.
2. Institutional Competence.—Considerations of institutional competence suggest one threshold qualification to the hybrid model proposed
above. When a statute addresses a subject not traditionally covered by the
common law, courts should be more concerned about exercising their

264. See Baade, supra note 121, at 90–91 (discussing the interplay between rules of statutory
construction and the common law).
265. See P.S. Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 48 MOD. L. REV. 1, 12 (1985) (noting that
courts tend to view the legislative reversal of judicial decisions as “not affecting the underlying
principles of those decisions”).
266. See D.C. PEARCE & R.S. GEDDES, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN AUSTRALIA 24–30
(5th ed. 2001) (discussing codified methodology).
267. Id. at 22 (citing Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214, 235 (Austl.)). Australian courts
traditionally allowed departure from text in cases of absurdity, although this exception appeared to
be limited to drafting mistakes. See id. at 21–22.
268. See Atiyah, supra note 265, at 8–9 (observing the historical reluctance of British courts to
fill in statutory gaps).
269. Cf. Scalia, supra note 142, at 23 (differentiating between reasonable textualism and strict
constructionism).
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inherent constitutional authority to extend statutory scope. The metaphor
about statutes displacing a common law backdrop arguably breaks down
when the legislature breaks new ground and, for example, enacts a
comprehensive scheme regulating public utilities. At that point, judicial
prudence may prioritize the search for legislative intent.270
Setting this qualifier aside, advocates of strong-form textualism or
purposivism on institutional grounds are likely to be unhappy with this
hybrid model. For them, there is no obvious reason why courts are more
likely to be better or worse at discerning historical intent or purpose,
identifying existing preferences, or making good policy when they extend
rather than narrow the linguistic scope of a statute.271 In that light, my
tentative proposal is an arbitrary half measure in the eyes of institutional
purists of all stripes. It is fair to ask whether considerations of institutional
competence do any work in this model.
Against claims of across-the-board purposivism on institutional
grounds, this model reflects an admittedly controversial prioritization of
constitutional norms and structures over concerns for institutional
competence. Even if courts are good at narrowing statutes to fit background
purposes, constitutional inferences limiting what courts can do with statutes
when the legislature has issued authoritative text may preclude this appeal to
expediency. Such institutional considerations, however, could be germane
when a legislature instructs or permits the court to consider purpose across
the board, a point I bracket given the constitutional disputes surrounding
such legislation.272
The answer to the institutional textualist must be different, for the
proposed model presumes that extension of statutes is generally within
constitutional bounds. Accordingly, any limits here will turn on prudential
decisions in which competence considerations play a central role. I can only
sketch the beginning of a response here, but it seems much will turn on the
subject matter of the statute. As noted, in areas where a statute
comprehensively supplants the common law or resolves problems
270. This is not to say such statutes completely displace the common law. For example, even
complex regulatory regimes governing power rates will require courts to repair to common law
principles governing contracts. See Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 811 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (giving deference to the agency’s interpretation of a
contract when the issue is the simple construction of language); Pojanowski, supra note 205, at
808–09 (noting the difficulty that arises when common law rules are ambiguous and reviewing
courts must decide between the agency’s interpretation and the court’s).
271. One may argue extension is less risky as a matter of policy because the legislature has
chosen to act and selected the policy vehicle that the court applies elsewhere. That argument falsely
presumes that using a good tool more often will lead to better solutions. More pulleying will not get
the job done when you need a block and tackle.
272. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2004) (instructing courts to engage in
purposive interpretation of unambiguous statutes); Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1771
(cataloging state courts’ resistance to legislation governing interpretive method); Manning,
Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 19, at 2441–45 (arguing that federal legislation requiring the
absurdity doctrine would be unconstitutional self-delegation by the legislature).
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surrounded by little common law precedent, hesitancy to expand statutory
scope is understandable. Where a statute touches on or mingles with
common law doctrine, such a presumption makes less sense. This occurs not
only because a court’s grasp of a statute’s legal and practical context may
improve its search for intent, purpose, current preferences, or good policy.273
State courts are also better positioned to cultivate coherence where common
law and statute overlap. The legislature’s presumptive awareness of existing
law may be a benevolent fiction in statutory interpretation, but it reflects the
reality of a court approaching legislation interwoven with a broader body of
common law. Courts are thus well positioned to decide whether it makes
sense to extend a statute’s scope in the name of coherence and consistency
with existing common law.274
3. Common Law and Concepts of Legal Interpretation.—At the
threshold, this proposal assumes the cogency of meaningfully separating
expressed semantic meaning from background purpose. This assumption is
controversial and its full defense is the work of a productive scholarly career,
not the subsection of an article. Nevertheless, the rise of textualism in state
court jurisprudence that Professor Gluck chronicles suggests that many
common law jurists share this assumption with the increasingly textualist
Supreme Court of the United States.275
A theorist who limits the concept of interpretation to understanding
semantic meaning or intent of a text will also object that extension of a
statute beyond its linguistic scope is not an act of “interpretation,” but is
rather legislation or something else.276 For my purposes, little turns on the
label. The primary inquiry here is whether a court should be allowed to
narrow or extend the semantic scope of a statute, whatever you may call such
tailoring. As a person with a restrictive understanding of “interpretation”
would agree, this question concerns matters of constitutional law or practical
consequences, not a debate about the definition of interpretation.277
This proposal is also agnostic about the nature of the common law. It is
amenable to one who thinks of common law precedent as a form of posited
law crafted by judges and defeasible by legislation.278 It is also amenable to
273. Compare supra section II(C)(2), with subpart III(B).
274. See, e.g., Traynor, Statutes Revolving, supra note 120, at 417–18 (discussing the example
of In re Mason’s Estate, 397 P.2d 1005 (Cal. 1965), involving the California Supreme Court’s
analogical extension of a probate code provision to a similar instance in the common law of
guardianship not covered by statute).
275. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1775–811.
276. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 96, at 98–99 (arguing that courts move beyond the
realm of interpretation when they decline to follow statutory language).
277. Perhaps the danger of infelicitously labeling an activity “interpretation” is to load the
rhetorical dice in favor of legitimacy. Judges are on safer ground if they are “interpreting” statutes
than when they are making law or consulting the brooding omnipresence.
278. To believe this, one need not hold that common law is strictly analogous to legislation.
See John Gardner, Some Types of Law, in COMMON LAW THEORY, supra note 125, at 51, 67–71
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one who views the common law as a body of custom or principle that is
distinct from legislative-type rules. One only needs to concede that common
law, whatever its nature, must yield on matters that statutes expressly
resolve. In other words, constitutional norms (and perhaps by extension
nonposited norms of political morality) can require preexisting, nonposited
common law to yield to authoritative legislative commands.
That said, there is an appealing jurisprudential ambidexterity in this
model absent in other approaches that either understand all forms of law and
interpretation in the statutory positivist idiom or submerge both statutes and
precedent in a framework of purposive or moral reading. It permits an
interpreter to embrace a principle-based theory of common law that does not
reduce adjudication to interstitial legislation while also treating statutes in the
fashion of posited rules that preempt judicial judgment with their scope. This
dualist understanding of law’s domains coheres with the intuitions of many
thoughtful lawyers, including jurists in commonwealth countries who must
integrate general common law powers with legislative supremacy.279 Nor,
more importantly, is it unprecedented in American jurisdictions that
recognize general common law.280 The intersection of two such domains
marks a plausible point of differentiation for state and federal interpretation,
and while negotiating this overlap poses challenges, theoretical complexity is
not always a sign of error.
B.

Explaining State Practice

This proposed model, however tentative, advances inquiry and
understanding in the developing field of state statutory interpretation. This
Article’s work on the effect of common law powers explains features of state
jurisprudence that existing scholarship does not. This is particularly so
regarding one of Professor Gluck’s most significant contributions—her
identification of a state court interpretative method she calls “modified
textualism.”281 In these “modified textualist” jurisdictions, one finds courts
flouting textualism (modified or otherwise) in a manner Gluck has not

(arguing that although case law constitutes positive law, it differs from legislation because it is not
expressly made and is the work of an individual agent, not an institutionalized group).
279. See, e.g., Brennan v Comcare (1994) 50 FCR 555, 572 (Austl.) (“The judicial technique
involved in constructing a statutory text is different from that required in applying previous
decisions expounding the common law.”).
280. As Professor Nelson explains, in the pre-Erie era, federal courts sitting in diversity would
exercise independent judgment on matters of general law but not on state court interpretations of
statutes. This deference extended to state legislation codifying or displacing what was previously
within the realm of general law. See Nelson, supra note 242, at 3–4. To this date, Georgia still
treats common law in the manner of Swift v. Tyson. See Green, supra note 98, at 1134–35. Even if
Georgia is an outlier, Professor Green notes how the choice-of-law rules in every state today are
Swift-ian in character. See id. at 1162–67. Nor do state courts appear to conceive of federal
common law in terms of post-Erie positivism. See Bellia, supra note 67, at 1540–41.
281. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1758.
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identified,282 namely at the crucial intersection of common law and statutes.
This Article’s proposed model explains these deviations from textualism and
provides a fuller understanding of state courts’ treatment of statutes.
Under Gluck’s “modified textualism,” a court first considers statutory
text, second considers legislative history, and third looks to background
norms. Because such courts only take incremental steps when an earlier one
does not decide the question, they resolve many cases on textualist grounds
alone.283 The model for “modified textualism” is the three-step inquiry the
Oregon Supreme Court announced in PGE v. Bureau of Labor &
Industries.284
Gluck argues that this new approach is textualist,
notwithstanding its use of legislative history.285 Moreover, because it
restricts the use of substantive canons like the absurdity doctrine, Gluck
argues that the method can be more textualist than federal approaches, which
allow for such correction.286
But even textualists with tolerance for legislative history may raise their
eyebrows when they look closer at the law in “modified textualist”
jurisdictions. Consider the Supreme Court of Oregon’s decision in Scovill v.
City of Astoria.287 There, a woman’s estate sued the city, claiming that its
police department’s failure to follow a statute requiring the officers to take
her to a detoxification facility caused her death.288 Invoking PGE, the city
moved to dismiss because the statute provided no explicit private right of
action or enforcement provision of any kind.289 This strategy was
understandable: the primacy of text over background norms in PGE
recommends a similar refusal to supply a private right of action in statutory
silence.290 Hornbook textualism, at least in federal scholarship, holds that a
legislative choice about textual means—here, no private right of action—

282. Gluck anticipates criticism from orthodox textualists regarding modified textualists’ use of
legislative history. Id. at 1758–59. This is not my concern and the “modified textualist” practice of
using legislative history parallels the moderate use of such sources in federal practice. See
Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1288 (noting the “longstanding practice of using
unenacted legislative history as authoritative evidence”).
283. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1836–37.
284. 859 P.2d 1143, 1146–47 (Or. 1993); see Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation
Methodology as “Law”: Oregon’s Path-Breaking Interpretive Framework and Its Lesson for the
Nation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 539, 540–41 (2011) (explaining the significance of the new test).
285. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1834–35.
286. See id. at 1758–59, 1851–52 (discussing modified textualism and federal courts’ lack of a
consistent methodological approach in use of substantive canons).
287. 921 P.2d 1312 (Or. 1996).
288. Id. at 1314.
289. Id. at 1318.
290. Compare J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (holding courts should provide
remedies to promote legislative purpose), with Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001)
(“We therefore begin (and find that we can end) our search for Congress’s intent [to provide a
private remedy] with the text and structure of Title VI.”).
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shows how the legislature values a goal vis-à-vis other considerations.291
One would think “modified textualism” step one—taking clear text as broad
or as narrow as drafted—would respect this choice.
Nevertheless, the Scovill court rejected the city’s argument, but not
because it rejected PGE and not because the statute’s text and history were
unclear enough to allow purposive interpretation. Instead, the court deemed
PGE irrelevant because its framework concerned statutory interpretation,
“not a change in substantive tort law.”292 Under tort law, Scovill explained, a
court decides whether to create a private right of action for a statutory
violation.293 The court concluded that a tort action would promote the
legislative purpose, particularly because the statute “does not specify other
means for its enforcement.”294 Despite Oregon’s purportedly textualist
methodology and despite the plaintiff’s reliance on a statute, the court
invoked its inherent common law power to supply a remedy in the absence of
an explicit prohibition.
Scovill is not an outlier. Consider the tort doctrine of negligence per se.
There, a court uses a statutory rule to define the breach element in a
negligence claim. This common law practice, which is embraced by the
majority of jurisdictions, three of Gluck’s four “modified textualist” states,
and the current Restatement of Torts, looks puzzling through federal
textualist eyes. A legislator willing to criminalize conduct at the cost of a
minor fine may feel differently about a plaintiff using the statute to collect a
substantial tort judgment.295 Thus, the first problem for a textualist is the
court’s decision that the statute is relevant at all given the absence of any
private right of action. This is similar to the worry the textualist has about
Scovill, as evidenced by the Third Restatement’s recognition that negligence
per se “reduces the significance” of inquiries about “implied statutory
cause[s] of action.”296

291. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 109, at 546 (arguing that courts should respect the
particular means legislatures have chosen to pursue a given goal).
292. Scovill, 921 P.2d at 1318 n.8.
293. Id. at 1318; see also id. at 1319 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A cmt.
c (1979)) (explaining that courts may create a tort remedy if doing so is “in furtherance of the
purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision”).
294. Id. at 1319.
295. This worry is not new. See Charles L.B. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal
Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361, 364 (1932) (“[I]t savors of absurdity to impute to the legislature
an intention to create a civil liability, where it has manifested no intention of creating a civil
remedy.”).
296. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. b
(2010); accord Lowndes, supra note 295, at 365 (“The difference between [the approaches of
negligence per se and an implied cause of action] in a given case may be one of technique rather
than result . . . .”); Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence
of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 865 n.19 (1996) (“Although . . .
negligence per se . . . is not the same as an implied cause of action . . . the two claims get the
plaintiff to the same place.”).
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A court that decides the statute is in play—textualist departure number
one—then affirms a second textualist heresy: a purposive inquiry asking
(a) whether the statute protects a defined class of people; (b) whether the
plaintiff is in the protected class of people; (c) whether the injury was the
kind of injury contemplated by the statute; and (d) whether the injury
occurred in the way contemplated by the statute.297 The resemblance to the
“mischief rule” of purposive interpretation is unmistakable.298 The fact that
the proper-class and proper-injury tests are functional equivalents to the duty
and proximate cause elements of the negligence tort further demonstrates that
the court’s primary concern is not the statute’s semantic meaning.
From the perspective of orthodox textualism, both decisions (i) to create
or infer from silence a private right to enforce a regulatory statute and (ii) to
mold the scope of the statute in common law fashion are problematic. One
can make similar arguments regarding state courts’ treatment of statutes in
other common law doctrines, such as the rule voiding the entirety of an
otherwise valid contract if one term requires a party to violate a statute.299
Oregon courts use the PGE method to determine if the contract calls for a
statutory violation, but do not pause to ask whether the statute permits its use
in such a broad fashion.300 This juxtaposition of modern textualism with a
classical common law extension of statutes301 suggests that state court
textualism is more modified than Gluck’s work suggests.
Under the hybrid parliamentary/common law method of interpretation
proposed here, however, the judicial supplementation of statutes in the face
of silence that flouts federal textualism may be legitimate for state courts.
Recall that one claimed difference that common law powers make is
disabling the federal textualist’s default rule against judicial lawmaking when
a statute is silent about a matter within its orbit.302 When the legislative
backdrop encompasses common law courts, the potential “domain” of the
statute may expand through judicial action absent contrary indicia in
297. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14, § 14
cmt. f (2010).
298. See Heydon’s Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (K.B.) 638, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b (announcing
the mischief rule).
299. See, e.g., Staffordshire Invs., Inc. v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 149 P.3d 150,
156–57 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (applying the PGE approach in the illegal contract context).
300. Id. at 157 (citing PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1146–47 (Or. 1993)).
301. Id. at 156–57 (analyzing enforceability of contract under Uhlmann v. Kin Daw, 193 P. 435
(Or. 1920)).
302. See Caroline Forell, Statutory Torts, Statutory Duty Actions, and Negligence Per Se:
What’s the Difference?, 77 OR. L. REV. 497, 514–15 (1998) (criticizing Scovill for failing to
acknowledge that the court, not the legislature, created the tort action); cf. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1916) (citing 1 Comyn’s Digest tit. (F)) (allowing a private damages
suit for a violation of the federal act “according to a doctrine of the common law . . . . Ubi jus ibi
remedium”); Harvey S. Perlman, Thoughts on the Role of Legislation in Tort Cases, 36
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 813, 834 (2000) (“The early common-law rule that every right deserves a
remedy was not based on a finding of legislative intent; it was a common-law rule even when
applied to protect a right created by statute.”).
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legislative text. For this reason, Ezra Ripley Thayer, the early twentiethcentury tort theorist and son of noted constitutional formalist James Bradley
Thayer, accepted the doctrine of negligence per se even though as a matter of
statutory interpretation he was inclined to draw negative inferences from
statutory omission of remedies.303
Now compare this judicial freedom in broadening statutes with the
hybrid model’s prohibition, articulated above, on common law courts
narrowing statutes. We can now see why Oregon’s PGE methodology
allows for actions like judicial creation of private remedies or contract
voidance while also joining academic textualists in rejecting the absurdity
doctrine. The difference common law powers make dissolves this apparent
tension in “modified” textualism and offers a more complete picture of state
court interpretation.
This framework’s ability to explain Oregon’s
textualist/common law hybrid suggests that the structural differences
between federal and state court textualism are even more significant than
Gluck’s work appreciates.304
C.

Avenues for Further Inquiry

The preceding discussion argues that a court’s inherent common law
authority may sanction some departure from federal textualism, but it does
not necessarily entail the wholesale purposivism advanced by federal
scholars and some of their state counterparts. Actual state court practice,
moreover, supports these theoretical arguments and in turn appears more
comprehensible in light of these insights. At the very least, this analysis
suggests caution before assuming that federal and state interpretive methods
must walk in lockstep. Nor should advocates of interpretive divergence
assume that the menu of options available to state courts is the same as those
available to federal courts. That said, this model and its assumptions require
further consideration, elaboration, and defense. A complete answer will
depend on how the questioner regards the institutional, constitutional, and
jurisprudential variables in interpretive choice—as well as the subquestions
under each category. The remainder of this Part flags further lines of inquiry
on state court interpretation arising from this Article’s contribution so far.
First, the three-part framework in Part III can aid comparative analysis
beyond the particular matter of common law powers. This analytical
framework separates interpretive choice along three axes: constitutional,
303. See Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 320
(1914). Thayer’s work on negligence per se and remedies anticipates by seventy years arguments
offered by textualists like Judge Easterbrook. See id. (“Proper regard for the legislature includes the
duty both to give full effect to its expressed purpose, and also to go no further. . . . Its omission [of
a civil remedy] must therefore be treated as the deliberate choice of the legislature, and the court has
no right to disregard it.”).
304. See Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1858–61 (noting differences between state and
federal courts but arguing that federal law and scholarship can nevertheless draw broader lessons
from state practice).
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institutional, and conceptual criteria. Different theorists will include,
exclude, and prioritize the three criteria differently, but considering those
aspects directly can clarify these commitments and help indicate whether,
why, and how a particular difference between court systems could translate
into a different approach to statutes. In the state–federal context, for
example, this framework can structure many inquiries, whether the points of
differences concern methods of judicial selection,305 judicial background,
caseload and subject matter, or judges’ quasi-legislative or executive duties.
Accordingly, the work thus far has sought not only to build and apply a
comparative framework for evaluating common law difference, but also to
offer an analytical structure for an emerging yet undertheorized area of
inquiry. Nor is its payoff limited to state–federal comparisons. The
framework can also clarify questions of interpretive divergence within a
given legal system306 and between nations.
This latter point brings us to the second line of further inquiry, which
flows from the recognition that interpretive theory concerning state courts
may profit more from increased focus on the high courts of our
commonwealth cousins and less on the U.S. Supreme Court. Although
questions about the nature and extent of general federal common law powers
may make reliance on the interpretive practice of commonwealth courts
controversial, for state courts, the constitutional analogy is cleaner. As
noted, both state and many commonwealth courts retain inherent common
law powers despite the presence of a legislature supreme in its ability to
trump judge-made law. In this respect, a rich vein of decisional law and
scholarship sits unmined by American scholars.
That said, scholars and jurists interested in pursuing this line should
note that the contextual translation may not be seamless. American states
have written constitutions with judicially enforceable limits on legislative
power. The United Kingdom famously does not,307 leading many jurists
there to regard the common law as the guarantor of rights. Thus,
parliamentary supremacy has long dueled with a tradition of unwritten
constitutionalism rooted in the common law.308
Common law
constitutionalism may partially explain these high courts’ stinting
construction of statutes even after parliamentary supremacy.309 This faith in
common law reason may also drive the broadly purposive statutory

305. See generally Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79.
306. See generally Bruhl, supra note 5 (comparing federal district and appellate courts).
307. But see Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §§ 3, 8 (U.K.) (providing a judicial remedy for
violations of the European Convention of Human Rights and requiring judges to interpret statutes,
to the extent possible, to be compatible with the convention).
308. For a helpful overview of current debates on common law constitutionalism in the United
Kingdom, see Thomas Poole, Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law
Constitutionalism, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (2003).
309. See Baade, supra note 121, at 90–91 (discussing how acts of Parliament that changed the
common law became interpreted restrictively and led to an era of strict construction).
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interpretation advocated by contemporary common law constitutionalists.310
To the extent that the impulse to privilege common law is a substitute for
written constitutional rights—as opposed to a thesis about the nature of the
judicial function—this strand of thought may have less relevance to statutory
interpretation in American states.
A closer analogue may lie even farther abroad. The High Court of
Australia authoritatively interprets the nation’s statutes and promotes and
develops a unified, national system of common law.311 Australia’s
“Washminster” form of government, which combines a written constitution
and bicameralism with a parliamentary government,312 suggests further
parallels with American state constitutional structure.313 Furthermore, as in
many American states, the Australian parliament has partially codified a
preferred method for statutory interpretation.314 Unlike in many American
states, the High Court also appears to take these statutes seriously.315 Thus,
while much federal jurisprudence on the relationship between statutes and
common law debates the latter’s legitimacy, Australian jurists are free to
probe the deeper questions without threshold doubts about the enterprise.316
Whatever the other differences in constitutional contexts, these more detailed
Australian discussions seem more promising for a state judge than, say,
arguments about Erie’s implications for federal common law.
In that vein, for state courts seeking federal guidance on statutory
interpretation, particularly at the intersection of the common law, the most
promising sources likely predate Erie and the lessons the Supreme Court has
drawn from it in the past thirty years. For example, a state court’s approach
to the intersection of tort law and statutes might properly resemble the
310. See, e.g., T.R.S. Allan, Text, Context, and Constitution: The Common Law as Public
Reason, in COMMON LAW THEORY, supra note 125, at 190 (“The better attainment of the statute’s
general purposes is a good reason for its extension to the doubtful case.”).
311. See JAMES CRAWFORD & BRIAN OPESKIN, AUSTRALIAN COURTS OF LAW 196–97 (4th ed.
1996) (detailing the Australian High Court’s functions as a final appellate court).
312. See, e.g., Elaine Thompson, The Constitution and the Australian System of Limited
Government, Responsible Government and Representative Democracy: Revisiting the Washminster
Mutation, 24 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 657, 657–58 (2001) (outlining the structure of the Australian
government). Despite Australia’s federal system, its High Court is more analogous to state supreme
courts than to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Commonwealth’s integrated judicial system makes the
High Court the court of final appeal for both federal and state questions. See CRAWFORD &
OPESKIN, supra note 311, at 42 (outlining the Australian High Court’s appellate jurisdiction).
313. American state governments are not parliamentary, as the executive branch is separate
from the legislature. Nevertheless, state governments traditionally have had strong legislatures and
weak or fragmented executives. WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 247, 303.
314. See Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA (Austl.) (giving preference to
interpretations that “best achieve the purpose or object of the Act”); id. s 15AB (codifying the
permitted use and sources of legislative history).
315. See PEARCE & GEDDES, supra note 266, at 25–28, 63 (describing the High Court’s
implementation of its provisions); cf. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1755–56, 1785–98
(describing state court resistance to codified methods of statutory interpretation).
316. See, e.g., Brennan v Comcare (1994) 122 ALR 555, 572 (Austl.) (analyzing the
differences between interpreting statutes and common law precedents).
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federal inquiry on private rights of action prior to the advent of increased
restrictions.317 Before then, the absence of an express provision of any right
of private enforcement was not enough to stay the court’s common law
powers.318 Nor did a court supplying a private action always understand its
act as implementing legislative intent.319 By contrast, courts would not
recognize private rights when statutory text, fairly read, contradicted such a
right or suggested a right would disturb a legislative scheme.320 It is telling
that this approach thrived in federal courts before Erie,321 which challenged
the legitimacy of federal common law and undermined this more liberal
approach to private rights of action.322
One final point in further need of exploration is precisely how to
negotiate the overlap between preexisting common law doctrine and
legislation. The Article’s proposal treats the state legal landscape as a tract
of common law that the legislature has a plenary right to displace or modify
through statutes. Assuming statutes can displace common law, the most
challenging questions concern the borderland of a statute’s domain. This
Article presents an approach analogous to “conflict preemption” in federal
law, allowing judicial development of law adjacent to legislation so long as
the two are not in direct conflict.323 Federal textualist assumptions, by
contrast, would require a model akin to “field” or “obstacle” preemption in
federal law: once a statute touches on a subject, concerns of institutional
competence or constitutional compromise militate against extending the
statute’s norms beyond its semantic scope or otherwise supplementing the
regime in common law fashion.324
The presence of common law powers softens the constitutional case for
a broader preemptive approach in the state context, but does not settle the
317. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291–93 (2001) (denying private right of action
absent explicit textual provision).
318. See H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private
Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 548 (1986) (stating that “[t]he
plaintiff was entitled to an adequate remedy for legal wrongs, including wrongs defined by
legislation”).
319. Id.
320. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 426 (1964) (“Federal courts will provide
the remedies required to carry out the congressional purpose of protecting federal rights.”).
321. See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1916) (allowing for a private
right of action because it was clearly implied in the context of the intended legislative scheme).
322. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287 (“‘Raising up causes of action where a statute has not
created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals.’”
(citation omitted)).
323. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260 (2000) (stating that state law is
only preempted when it “contradicts a rule validly established by federal law”); cf. Williams, supra
note 254, at 554, 563 (arguing that a statute’s failure to cover an area should not raise a “negative
preemption” inference concerning common law extension of that statute by analogy).
324. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424–25 (2003) (invoking the doctrine of
“obstacle” preemption to override state law which frustrates, but does not formally conflict with,
federal law or policy); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (discussing the doctrine of
field preemption).
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issue. A particular theory about the nature of certain common law doctrines,
for example, may decide the practical wisdom of allowing judicial
elaboration in the statutory periphery. If, as many contend or assume, private
law subjects like torts, contracts, or property are merely “public law in
disguise,”325 the institutional competence objections to judicial
supplementation of legislative policy through case-by-case adjudication
could be substantial.326 By contrast, if there is warrant for the traditional
conception of private law as reasonably autonomous from public law,
internally coherent, and normatively appealing—points reasserted by a
number of recent theorists327—the case against displacing swaths of common
law by negative implication is stronger. Ironically, it is private-law
instrumentalists who have argued for broad judicial license with respect to
legislation,328 while those who defend the autonomy of private law have
shown little theoretical interest in statutes.329 The strongest case against
broad statutory preemption of common law will need to attract the attention
and draw on the resources of the right private law theorists.
V.

Looking Beyond State Courts

A.

Federal Courts

This Article’s first contribution to federal interpretation is its suggestion
that the relationship between textualism, purposivism, and the common law
is more complex than those debates often assume. In the federal context,
skepticism of federal common law runs in tandem with misgivings about

325. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1959); see also
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 71–72 (1972) (arguing that the
purpose of tort law is to create incentives for efficient precaution); Fleming James, Jr., Tort Law in
Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 BUFF. L. REV. 315, 334–37 (1959)
(encouraging tort doctrine to spread the cost of accidents through enterprise liability).
326. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 148, at 886 (arguing that statutory interpretation
would be aided by a closer examination of institutional capacities and dynamic effects).
327. See generally WEINRIB, supra note 168, at 206 (arguing that private law is autonomous
because of the self-regulative nature of its immanent rationality); Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights
Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1873, 1873–74 (2011) (arguing that private law is
best understood as a means for individuals to exercise their moral enforcement rights); John C.P.
Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1661 (2012)
(rejecting the theory that the norms of private law reduce to norms of public law).
328. Compare Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle, supra note 240, at 751 (“[Judging entails] the
recurring choice of one policy over another [in the formulation of new rules].”), with Traynor,
Statutes Revolving, supra note 120, at 401–03 (arguing for judicial freedom to narrow and extend
statutes in light of common sense and sound policy); see also Robert E. Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and
Values in Tort Law, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 19 (1978) (arguing for policy-oriented interpretation of
statutes intersecting with tort law).
329. Professor Zipursky, however, recently has demonstrated how non-instrumental private law
theory can shed light on public law questions concerning constitutional limits on punitive damages
and federal preemption of state law. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and
Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757 (2012).
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purposivism.330 By contrast, belief in broad federal common law powers
often runs with purposivist or dynamic interpretation.331 The shared premise
upon which these factions differ is that a grant of common law powers is an
on–off switch between thoroughgoing purposivism and formalist approaches
like textualism.
Yet some plausible institutional or jurisprudential
approaches discussed in Part III indicate that the connection between
common law powers and purposive interpretation may be fragile or
contingent. Indeed, given the tendency for many purposivist or dynamic
theorists to blur the lines between interpretation of precedent and
interpretation of statutes, a grant of common law powers may be redundant in
the argument against textualist interpretation. Even if common law powers
do make some difference, the proposal in subpart IV(A) also underlines how
they may not entail thoroughgoing purposivism. A court’s defeasible
authority to make law on its own may be irrelevant when a superior legislator
has spoken clearly. Accordingly, broad common law powers may only give
federal courts the ability to extend a statute’s coverage in the face of silence,
and not the ability to contradict clear text. This is more than an orthodox
federal textualist would allow, but less than a purposivist or dynamic
interpreter would seek.
Second, this Article’s analysis may inform federal courts’ approach to
statutes that intersect with federal common law. In particular, courts could
modulate their approach depending on whether they are operating in a
traditional enclave of residual common law powers—such as admiralty or
interstate disputes—or making interstitial common law to protect federal
interests.332 Even for an orthodox federal textualist, subpart IV(A)’s proposed approach for state courts could apply for statutes intersecting with
traditional enclaves, while the usual textualist worries about federal common
lawmaking would pertain in the interstitial setting.333

330. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 113, at 352 n.92 (critiquing expansive approaches to federal
common law that “would provide virtually no constraint on federal judicial lawmaking” and would
impose “little more than a pleading barrier before federal courts could take off on an unguided
exercise formulating new rules of decision based on perceptions of utility”); Martin H. Redish,
Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist”
Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 768–69 (1989) (critiquing judicial policy choices where a
legislature has already indicated its own choice on the same subject).
331. See, e.g., Field, supra note 140, at 317 (arguing that the creation of federal common law
does not violate separation of powers principles); Weinberg, supra note 140, at 846–47 (celebrating
living common law as “more closely in touch with the current political will than is the dead hand of
an old code”).
332. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (holding that in
such cases, it “is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own
standards” in the absence of statutes).
333. This analysis would be similarly applicable to questions at the intersection of legislated
rules of procedure and federal courts’ inherent powers to craft procedural common law. See
generally Barrett, supra note 257 (describing the procedural common law powers of federal courts).
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We can understand this point by examining two controversial federal
common law cases. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,334 the Supreme
Court modified its common law of admiralty to allow for a wrongful death
action.335 It did so in part to advance what it saw as a congressional policy in
favor of such recoveries, as evidenced by federal legislation on maritime
accidents that concededly did not govern the case.336 Even Judge Posner, an
avowed purposivist, has criticized Moragne’s modification of the common
law for functionally amending the relevant legislation and making it harder
for Congress to strike legislative bargains on maritime legislation in the
future.337 Next, in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,338 the Court crafted a
federal common law defense for military contractors facing state tort suits for
injuries caused by allegedly defective products sold to the government.339
There could be no liability when the equipment conformed to governmentapproved specifications and the supplier warned the government of known
risks.340 This defense for contractors was necessary, Boyle explained, in part
to protect a federal interest, namely the government’s “discretionary
function” statutory defense to negligence claims under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.341 Dissenters and commentators criticized this holding on
separation of powers grounds, arguing that the Court created a defense where
the statutory text plainly had not.342
From the perspective of federal separation of powers textualism, both
decisions are problematic. Moragne’s revision of maritime doctrine
effectively expanded the scope of the Death on the High Seas Act and Boyle
preempted state law because a dispute between two private parties might
indirectly frustrate the aims of a government immunity statute not involved in
the litigation. The proposed approach for state courts in subpart IV(A),
however, suggests that criticism of Moragne is misplaced. Residual pockets
of common law, like admiralty law, resemble state court realities more than
the post-Erie federal universe of limited jurisdiction. For this reason,
Moragne’s development of admiralty law to reflect the Court’s—and
Congress’s—preferred policy on wrongful death suits is no more problematic

334. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
335. Id. at 409.
336. Id. at 408–09.
337. Posner, supra note 156, at 203.
338. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
339. Id. at 511–12.
340. Id. at 512.
341. Id. at 511; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
342. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515–16, 526–29 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
took on a legislative role when it created the government contractor defense in disregard of
Congress’s prior refusal to create a similar defense); see also Larry J. Gusman, Note, Rethinking
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. Government Contractor Defense: Judicial Preemption of the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers?, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 395 (1990) (asserting that the Court, in
barring recovery for individuals harmed by a product designed by a government contractor,
“functioned as the writer of laws, rather than the interpreter of laws”).
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than, for example, negligence per se in state courts. Given the Court’s
defeasible power to make maritime law, Congress’s silence in this enclave of
common law does not raise the negative inference it might in the run-of-themill federal setting. Matters appear differently outside of residual enclaves,
leaving Boyle and other attempts to protect federal interests still vulnerable to
the separation of powers criticism that the courts leaped from statutory
interpretation to illicit statutory extension.343
B.

Intersystemic Interpretation

Comparative statutory interpretation raises the question—posed by
Gluck in recent work on state–federal statutory interpretation—of whether a
court interpreting a statute from another jurisdiction should follow the
interpretive method of the other jurisdiction’s courts.344 According to Gluck,
this question also requires us to ask whether statutory interpretive
methodology is “law.”345 Gluck answers both questions in the affirmative,
pointing to (1) state courts’ regard of their own interpretive methods as
binding, (2) analogies to law governing other kinds of “interpretation,” and
(3) the post-Erie, positivist understanding of law.346 The three-pronged
analysis of interpretive choice described in Part III indicates that the answers
to these questions turn on one’s criteria for interpretive choice. In short,
Gluck’s answers may or may not be correct, but we cannot know without
further inquiry.
For the institutional interpreter, wondering whether interpretation is
“law” is not a particularly helpful exercise. Whatever “law” is, the central
question is what approach to intersystemic interpretation fits the competences
of the interpreter. For example, an institutionalist may conclude that a state
court should be purposivist in interpreting state statutes and that a federal
court should be textualist in interpreting federal statutes.347 The analysis may
further suggest, however, that a federal court’s institutional limits are such
that adopting the state court’s purposivist stance in diversity cases may do
more harm than good.348
Similar caution may also apply to interpretation across states lines.
Institutional analysis could indicate that courts in State A should read
State A’s statutes purposively, that courts in State B should read State B’s
statutes purposively, but that courts in State A and State B may best promote
relevant values by reading each other’s statutes through a textualist lens. Or,
343. Cf. Merrill, supra note 113, at 347 (“The use of federal common law in admiralty cases
and interstate disputes is harder to reconcile with an anti-prerogative framework.”).
344. Gluck, Intersystemic, supra note 9, at 1903.
345. Id. at 1902.
346. Id. at 1972, 1976–77, 1988–89.
347. Cf. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 148, at 928 (suggesting that institutional
considerations can illustrate why certain entities, such as agencies, should be either bound to a
textualist approach to statutory interpretation or given the authority to abandon textualism).
348. VERMEULE, supra note 112, at 282–83.
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as Bruhl and Leib have suggested, given the empirical uncertainty and the
decision costs of trying to resolve this question, courts may be better off not
even asking whether interpretive method should travel with the statute.349
Under institutional analysis, the intersystemic decision is contingent on facts
and capacities, which possibly does not allow for any ready, global solution.
Although constitutional regimes are also contingent, the constitutions
that the federal government and the states already have may lead to a more
fixed approach to methodological translation. Beyond the requirements that
states have a republican form of government and forbid bills of attainder, the
federal Constitution has little to say about particular separation of powers
arrangements in the states. Constitutional values of federalism and state
sovereignty, then, could suggest that federal courts should strive to apply
state methodology in diversity cases, just as they would strive to follow the
dictates of other forms of state law.350 This appears to be so even if it
requires federal courts to apply to state statutes methods that would violate
federal separation of powers if applied to federal law. If a federal court can
sometimes hear a case that would be justiciable under state, but not federal,
law,351 perhaps it can also apply interpretive methods derived from other
constitutions. Thus, if the “law” of statutory interpretation is a refraction of
constitutional law, federal courts under our constitutional order may have an
obligation to respect methodological differences.
Finally, the intersystemic question may turn on the theorist’s standpoint
regarding the nature of interpretation and law. Echoing Gluck’s approach, an
interpreter who understands all law as posited law can treat another
jurisdiction’s interpretive method as binding doctrine that supervenes upon
substantive rules of decision.352 By contrast, a theorist like Dworkin may
argue that a faithful interpreter has no choice but to read any statute in light
of background purposes and the best reading of that community’s principles
of political morality.353 Or, following Alexander, the theorist may limit
“interpretation” to identifying legislative intent. If that task is harder for a

349. See Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1269 (“[T]hese challenging questions may very well
generate good reasons to reject interpretive divergence.”); Bruhl, supra note 5, at 494–95 (noting
that differences in competence can militate against adoption of methodology across systems).
350. Gluck, Intersystemic, supra note 9, at 1990–91 (arguing that state and federal courts
should engage in a “dialectical federalism” for statutory interpretation).
351. Cf. Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 623–24 (1989) (applying Arizona standing
principles to hear a controversy even if it would have been nonjusticiable under federal justiciability
doctrine).
352. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 112–13
(“Substance and process are intimately related. The procedures one uses determine how much
substance is achieved, and by whom. Procedural rules usually are just a measure of how much the
substantive entitlements are worth, of what we are willing to sacrifice to see a given goal
attained.”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085, 2108 (2002) (“Interpretive rules are substantive law, and they go hand in hand with the
substantive statutes of the legislatures that create them.”).
353. DWORKIN, supra note 229, at 87–88.
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court to do from afar, the court will have to engage in more guesswork, or
lawmaking and less interpretation. But the “interpretation” portion of
decision making will be the same in substance—the distance works a
difference of degree, not kind. Despite their differences, Alexander and
Dworkin would agree that jurisdictional boundaries are irrelevant to the
nature of interpretation. For them, treating interpretive method as “law” in
the post-Erie sense is like trying to promulgate binding rules of grammar and
syntax, or to amend our background principles of political morality. It is to
take a metaphor too far.
In sum, the framework deployed in this Article suggests that the answer
to the question of whether interpretive methodology is statute-trailing “law”
turns on what you mean by “law.” The answer varies depending on whether
we conceive of the law of statutory interpretation as the product of pragmatic
considerations, constitutional law, the concept of legal interpretation itself, or
some combination of the three. Or perhaps this broader inquiry—
identifying, prioritizing, or reconciling these three aspects—is itself the
“law” of statutory interpretation.354 Given this complexity within and among
these aspects of interpretive choice, we should not be surprised that we find
confusion and inconsistency in the courts’ approaches to interpretation across
legal systems. Appreciating this dynamic may be the beginning of wisdom.
Conclusion
A good way to gain new appreciation of your first language is to learn a
second one. A good way to find something you have misplaced is to stand
on a chair and view the room from another angle. Working through the
interpretive implications of differences between state and federal courts is
important in its own right. In doing so, we also rotate a crystal whose
refractions cast federal and general interpretation in a different light. At a
time when debate regarding interpretation in the federal context seems
locked at a stalemate, fresh perspective is all the more welcome. This Article
helps discern the effects of common law powers on a court’s treatment of
statutes, while also advancing the theory of intersystemic interpretation. It is
not the last word on either, but it points the way forward to an improved
understanding of state, federal, and general interpretation alike.

354. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 8 (1983) (“The law contains within itself a legal science, a meta-law, by which it
can be both analyzed and evaluated.”).

